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Constitutional Dimensions of the Battered Woman
Syndrome
ERICH D. ANDERSEN* AND ANNE READ-ANDERSEN**
The exclusion of expert witness testimony on the battered woman
syndrome ("syndrome") m a criminal trial often raises both evidentiary and
constitutional issues for appeal.' Defendants typically offer testimony on the
syndrome to prove that they acted m self-defense when they killed or wounded
their mates.2 If the trial court excludes the testimony for lack of foundation or
because it is irrelevant, for instance, this exclusion creates a potential
evidentiary issue for appeal. 3 The same ruling may also raise a constitutional
question because the accused has a constitutional right to present a defense.4
The right to present a defense is implicated when the trial court excludes
evidence that is favorable and material to the defense.5
Scholars have been attentive to the evidentiary problems associated with
excluding testimony on the syndrome. Over the past decade, many
commentators have considered whether, and if so when, expert testimony
should be admitted to support a battered woman's assertion of self-defense.6
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I See Thomas v. Am, 728 F.2d 813, 815 (6th Cir. 1984) (Jones, I., concurring), affid,
474 U.S. 140 (1985); Tourlakas v. Moms, 738 F Supp. 1128 (S.D. 01o 1990); Fennell v.
Goolsby, 630 F Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1985); State v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209 (MI. Ct. App.
1983); State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d 421, 428-29 (La. App. 1985).
2 See, e.g., Tourlalas, 738 F Supp. at 1129.
3 See, e.g., State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989); People v. Ans, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
4 See supra note 1.
5 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
6 See, e.g., Loraine Patricia Eber, The Battered WIfe's Dilemma. To Kill or Be Killed,
32 HAsTINGs L. J. 895 (1981); Victoria Mikesell Mather, The Skeleton in the Coset: The
Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MEPcER L. REV 545
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Among the questions they have considered are the following: Whether the
syndrome theory is scientifically viable; whether it is beyond the ken of the
jury; and whether testimony on the syndrome should be admitted m cases m
which the facts fit the traditional notion of self-defense imperfectly.
In a growing number of cases, however, courts have considered whether
the exclusion of testimony on the syndrome violates the accused's constitutional
right to present a defense.7 Unlike the evidentiary questions presented by the
syndrome, the constitutional issues have not received much scholarly
attention.8
There are two apparent reasons for the lack of commentary. First, there are
relatively few published opinions on the constitutional issues.9 Neither the
Supreme Court nor any federal appeals court has explored these constitutional
problems m any depth, 10 despite provocative language m a dissent from a
demal of certiorari by the Supreme Court11 and a thoughtful concurring
(1988); David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to
the A&sibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Crninal Cases, 66 OR. L.
REV 19, 48-50 (1987); Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting A
Histoncal Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV 11 (1986);
Carolyn Wilkes Kass, Comment, The Adrmssibility of Expert Testimony on the Battered
Woman Syndrome in Support of a Clmm of Self-Defense, 15 CONN. L. REV 121 (1982).
The most notable and cogent criticism of the syndrome theory and its evidentiary value
is m David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal
and Empincal Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV 619 (1986).
For a comparative law approach to the subject, see B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us
Part: A Comparative Law Approach to Justifying Lethal Self-Defense by Battered Women,
1991 DUKEJ. OFCOMP. & INT'LL. 169 (1991).
7 See Thomas v. Am, 728 F.2d 813, 815 (6th Cir. 1984) (Jones, I., concurring);
Tourlakis v. Morrs, 738 F Supp. 1128 (S.D. Olho 1990); Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F.
Supp. 451 (E.D. Penn. 1985); State v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209 (11 Ct. App. 1983); State v.
Burton, 464 So. 2d 421, 428-29 (La. App. 1985); see also State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364,
376 n.11 (NJ. 1984) (state may not bar the introduction of expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome by stipulating that the defendant's fear of bodily harm was serious
because to do so would violate the defendant's due process right to offer testimony
establishing a defense).
8 Only two recent articles touch briefly on constitutional issues related to the battered
woman syndrome. See Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a "Better
Mousetrap," 32 S. TEX. L. 1. 37, 73-74 (1990) (one-page discussion of the constitutional
right to present a defense in the context of syndrome evidence); Cathleen C. Herasmchuk,
A Practical Guide to the Admssibility of Novel Expert Evidence in Cnrminal Trials Under
Federal Rule 702, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 181, 199-206 (1990) (brief discussion of
constitutional rights m the context of a larger discussion about expert testimony in criminal
trials).
9 See case listed supra note 7.
10 The published opimons on this subject come from the state courts and federal district
courts. See cases listed supra note 1.
11 See Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 948 (1984) (Brennan, I. and Marshall, J.,
dissenting from demal of certiorari).
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opinion in a Sixth Circuit case. 12 Second, the constitutional issues are a second-
generation concern: they were not pertinent issues until the first-generation
questions about the scientific validity and admissibility of the syndrome became
reasonably well settled. 13
The significant and growing number of cases involving constitutional
challenges and the emerging consensus on the scientific and legal viability of
the syndrome theory indicate that the time is ripe for an examination of the
constitutional dimensions of the battered woman syndrome. Parts I and I of
this Article are the foundation for this discussion. Part I is an overview of the
syndrome itself. Part II briefly addresses evidentiary issues, with an emphasis
on the admissibility of testimony on the syndrome m nontraditional self-defense
cases m which a batterer was not physically abusive at the time of or
immediately prior to the woman's offense. Part m analyzes situations m which
the exclusion of testimony on the syndrome may violate the defendant's
constitutional right to present a defense. Part III argues that courts which
exclude the testimony m certain nontraditional, self-defense cases will deny the
defendant the constitutional right to present a defense. Finally, Part IV briefly
considers whether an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to a state-paid
expert on the syndrome.
12 See Thomas v. Am, 728 F.2d 813, 815 (6th Cir. 1984) (lones, J., concurring):
In my view, the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony on the "battered wife
syndrome" impugned the fundamental fairness of the trial process thereby deprving
lthe defendant] of her constitutional right to a fair trial. There is sufficient literature
which suggests that the public and thus, juries, do not understand the scope of the
problem concerning battered women. Furthermore, they tend to be unsympathetic
toward battered women. They fail to understand, for instance, why battered women do
not leave their partners. Ascertaining a battered woman's state of mind is crucial to a
determination of this and other aspects of her behavior. It may bear on the responsibility
or lack of it, for her response. In my opinion the expert testimony could have clarified
the unique psychological state of mind of the battered woman and should have been
admitted by the trial judge. The law cannot be allowed to be mired in antiquated notions
about human responses when a body of knowledge is available which is capable of
providing insight.
Id. (citations omitted).
13 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), demonstrates how scientific acceptance of a
theory plays a role in determining the strength of a constitutional challenge to the exclusion
of testimony on the subject of the science. In Rock, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed
with the defendant that she had a constitutional right to present her own hypnotically-
refreshed testimony m her defense. The Court emphasized that even though hypnosis is an
inexact science, still in its infancy, it nevertheless is a valid therapeutic techmque. Id. at 58.
The dissent, however, focused on the fact that there is no general consensus on the
reliability of hypnotically-refreshed testimony and, therefore, it was reasonable for Arkansas
to exclude it in all cases. Id. at 62.
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I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SYNDROME
Over the past twenty-five years, researchers have come to recognize that
domestic abuse is a widespread phenomenon m our culture.14 They estimate
that between 1.6 and 4 million women are beaten each year by their husbands
or boyfriends.15 Only a small number of these women kill their abusive
mates. 16 These women often share siuilar psychological characteristics that
have come to be known as the battered woman syndrome.' 7
Researchers have begun to understand the causes and effects of the spouse-
abuse problem while they are learmng of its broad scope. In early studies of
domestic violence, many researchers posited that women who enter into and
remain m abusive relationships are masochistic.18 Subsequent studies rejected
the notion that abused women remain in abusive relationships to exorcise
14 See generally Nan Oppenlander, The Evolution of Law and Wife Abuse, 3 LAW &
POLICY Q. 382 (1981); Eber, supra note 6, at 897-99; Rosen, supra note 6, at 11-12.
15 Straus and Gelles conservatively estimate that 1.6 million women suffer abuse by an
intimate partner each year. Straus & Gelles, Societal Change and Otange in Family
iolence from 1975 to 1986 as Revealed by Two National Surveys, 48 J. OF MARRIAGE
AND THE FAMILY 465, 465-79 (1986). Other researchers have estimated that tis number
may be two to four million. See Kerry A. Shad, Comment, State v. Norman: Self-Defense
Unavailable to Battered Women Who Kill Passive Abusers, 68 N.C.L. REV 1159, 1164
n.39 (1990).16 According to the Philadelphia-based National Clearinghouse for Defense of Battered
Women, 800 to 1,000 of those battered women will be charged with the murder of an
abusive husband or boyfriend. Georgia Sargeant, 'Battered Woman Syndrome' Gaining
Legal Recognition, TRIAL, April 1991 at 17.
17 The American Psychological Association has filed several amicus curiae briefs m
crinmal cases, urging that expert testimony on the syndrome be admitted. See Lenore E.
Walker, Battered Women, Psychology, and Public Policy, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1179,
1179-82 (1984).
18 See R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIvES 134-
37 (1979); John R. Lion, ainical Aspects of Wife Battenng, in BATTERED WOMEN: A
PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 126 (M. Roy ed. 1977); SHIRLEY
PANKEN, JOY OF SUFFERING (1973); Laurie Wardell, et al., Science and Violence Against
Wives, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMIuES 69, 74-75 (1983); Paul E. Kaunitz,
Sadomasochstic Mamages, 11 MED. AsPECts OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 66, 66-80 (1977);
John E. Snell, et al., The Wifebeater's Wife: A Study of Famly Interaction, 11 ARCHiVES
OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 107, 107-12 (1964).
In People v. Powell, 442 N.Y.S.2d 645 (App. Div. 1981), for example, the defendant
was portrayed at trial as a willing participant m her physical and sexual abuse. The appellate
court affirmed the defendant's second degree murder conviction, finding that portraying the
abuse as a normal part of the marital relationship was a valid way to rebut the defendant's
contention that the victim was a violent man whom she feared. See also State v. Griffiths,
610 P.2d 522, 543 (Idaho 1980) (in closing argument, prosecutor asked the jury: "If Joe
was that bad, . why didn't the defendant divorce him? Why didn't she just leave him?").
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neurotic conflict.19 These later studies have validated the theory that many
complex factors are often present m battering relationships. 20
The syndrome has roots extending far below the surface of the domestic
relationship into the past of the abuser and the abused. Many women who
remain in abusive relationships were raised in families m which the use of
violence was accepted; often their abusive mates were also raised in abusive
homes. 21 In addition, battered women tend to have traditional views of
marriage, seeing their husbands or boyfriends as rightfully dommant.22
19 Many of the groundbreakng studies were published in the 1970s. See generally
RICHARD I. GELLEs, THE VioLENT HOME: A STUDY OF PHYSICAL AGGRESSION
BErWEEN HUSBANDS AND WIVEs (1971); ROGER LANGLEY & RICHARD C. LEVY, WIFE
BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS (1977); DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIvES (1976);
BATrERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (M. Roy ed.
1977); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter, WALKER, THE
BATrERED WOMAN].
20 See Karen E. Kosloff, The Battered Woman. A Developmental Perspective, 54
SMiTH COLLEGE STUDIES IN SOCIAL WORK 181, 181-203 (1984) (overview of literature
concerning battered woman syndrome from a developmental perspective).
21 Maria Roy, A Current Survey of 150 Cases, in BATrEPED WOMEN: A
PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLANCE (M. Roy ed. 1977); MURRAY A.
SIRAUS, Er AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1980);
Margaret Elbow, Theoretical Consuderations of Violent Mamages, 58 SOCIAL CASEWORK
515, 515-26 (1977); John P Flynn, Recent Findngs Related to Wife Abuse, 58 SOCIAL
CASEWORK 13 (1977); .IJ. Gayford, Wife Battenng: A Prelhinnay Review of 100 Cases, 1
BRITISH MEDICAL J. 194, 194-97 (1975); Richard J. Gelles, Abused Wives: Why do they
Stay?, 38 1. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 659, 659-68 (1976); Susan E. Hanks & C.
Peter Rosenbaum, Battered Women: A Study of Women Who Live with Violent Alcohol-
Abusing Men, 47 AM. I. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 291 (1977); Elaine Hilberman & Kit
Munson, Sixty Battered Women, 2 VICrIMOLOGY 460 (1977-78).
Batterers, too, have certain similarities in their backgrounds. They often abuse alcohol
or drugs. Maria Roy, A Current Survey of 150 Cases, in BATrERED WOMEN: A
PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (M. Roy ed. 1977); JJ. Gayford,
Wife Battenng: A Preliminary Review of 100 Cases, 1 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 104,
104-97 (1975); see, e.g., Fleming v. Huch, 924 F.2d 679, 679 (7th Cir. 1991) (most
incidents of abuse occurred after batterer had been drinking and were followed by periods
of apologetic remorse); Taylor v. Dawson, 888 F.2d 1124, 1126 (6th Cir. 1989) (batterer
abused cocaine); Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d 1325, 1325-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(both victim and battered wife were alcoholics; at the time batterer was killed, his blood
alcohol level was .42%).
Batterers were often abused as children. While batterers may have a history of arrests
and convictions, see, e.g., Taylor, 888 F.2d at 1126, they are not normally violent toward
nonmembers of their immediate family.
22 MILDRED D. PAGELOW, WOMAN-BATERING: VICTIMS AND THEIR
EXPERIENCES (1981).
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Frequently, battered women who remain m their abusive relationships also hold
strong views about the permanence of mamage.23
Other characteristics develop only after the battered women have been
subjected to a sustained pattern of abuse by their partners. 24 These battered
women are more inclined toward aggressive behavior.25 They exhibit higher
fear responses than their nonbattered counterparts. 26 For the purposes of this
Article, one of the most important psychological features of battered women is
"learned helplessness."
Before discussing this "learned helplessness" concept in detail, we will
examine what several researchers have identified as the "cycle of violence,"
which explains why battered women often develop complex and counter-
intuitive coping mechanisms and psychological disorders.27 Together, the
concepts of learned helplessness and the cycle of violence help explain
behaviors of battered women which seem illogical to uninstructed lay observers
like judges and juries.
A. The Cycle of Violence
The abuse often takes place in a cyclical pattern in a battering
relationship. 28 There are three recognized phases in the cycle of abuse: a
23 See generally, Barbara Star, Comparing Battered and Non-Battered Women, 3
VICIIMOLOGY 32, 32-44 (1978).
24 In addition to psychological disorders, battered women sometimes suffer from
psychiatric disorders such as definite or possible antisocial personality disorder, major
depression, and alcohol abuse and/or dependence. See Roger Bland & Helene Or, Family
Violence and Psychiatric Disorder, 31 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 129, 132-36 (1986).
See also Richard K. Goodstem & Ann W Page, Battered Wfe Syndrome: Overview of
Dynamrcs and Treatment, 138 AM. I. OF PsYCHIATRY 1036, 1037 (1981) (discussing Yale
study that found 65% of battered women m study group had a history of some psychiatric
treatment).
25 Debra A. Dalton & James E. Kanter, Aggression in Battered and Non-Battered
Women as Reflected in the Hand Test, 53 PSYCHOL. REP. 703,703-09 (1983).2 6 Irene Gianakos & Edwin E. Wagner, Relations Between Hand Test Variables and
the Psychological Characteristics and Behaviors of Battered Women, 51 1. OF
PERsONALyrY ASSEssMENT 221, 221-27 (1987).
27 See WALKcER, THE BATrERED WOMAN supra note 19, at 55; R. Emerson Dobash,
et al., Wifebeating: The Victins Speak, 2 VICrIMOLOGY 608, 608-22 (1978); Kathleen 1.
Ferraro & John M. Johnson, How Women Experience Battering: The Process of
Victinmzation, 30 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 325, 325-39 (1983); Laura Wetzel & Mary Anne
Ross, Psychological and Social Ramfications of Battering: Observations Leadi'ng to a
Counseling Methodology for Victims of Domestic Violence, 61 PERS. & GUIDE. J. 423,
423-28 (1983).
2 8 See LENOREE. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHYBATrERED WOIEN ILL AND
How SOCIETY RESPONDS 42 (1989) [hereinafter, WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE].
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tension-building phase, an acute battering incident, and a period of contrition
by the battering partner.29
During the tension-building phase, abuse is manifested only in "mild"
forms: pinching, slapping, and verbal or psychological abuse.30 This phase
may conceivably last as long as ten years.3 1 The battered woman often reacts to
this abuse by becoming docile, placating her partner, or by making studied
attempts to avoid him.32 The battered woman's chief goal during this stage of
the cycle is to prevent the violence from escalating into a full-blown battering
incident.33 It is during this period that a woman may attempt to escape from
her batterer.34
At a certain point, and often due to an unpredictable provocation, the
tension comes to a head and an acute battering incident results. This part of the
cycle is brief; it may last between two and twenty-four hours.35 The victim
may sometimes intentionally provoke the acute battering incident in order to get
it over with, in the belief that a violent confrontation is inevitable.36 The
viciousness and savagery of the acute battering incident is far removed from the
relatively minor abuse that takes place during the tension-building phase.37
While bruises are the most common injuries resulting from one of these
incidents, the battered woman may also sustain broken bones or internal
injuries.38 Sometimes guns, knives, and other weapons are revolved. 39 The
victim may be raped or subjected to other severe sexual abuse during an acute
battering mcident.40 If possible, the victim will avoid medical treatment or put
29 Id.
30 See I&
31 See WAiKER, THE BAnrERE WOMAN, supra note 19, at 58.
32 See WALKER, TERRFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 42-43.
33 Id at43.
34 Lenore E. Walker, et al., Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REV
1, 6 (1982) [hereinafler Walker, Beyond the Juror's Ken].
35 See WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 19, at 60.
36 Id.
37 WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 43.
38 See, e.g., State v. White, 414 N.E.2d 196, 198 (IlM. Ct. App. 1980) (im successive
incidents of abuse, the batterer broke girlfriend's ankle, dislocated her elbow, struck her m
the face with a bottle, hit her on the head with a car jack, and broke four of her ribs, for
wich she required medical treatment at least six times).
39 See, e.g., Tourlakis v. Mors, 738 F Supp. 1128, 1130 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (batterer
held straight razor to Ins girlfriend's throat); Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F Supp. 451, 457
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (batterer burned his wife with a cigarette and threatened her with a knife);
People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831, 831 (Colo. 1989) (batterer repeatedly pointed loaded gun
between his girlfiend's eyes and threatened to kill her); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555
A.2d 772, 775-76 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (batterer tried to run down former girlfriend with hIs car
and turned on the gas in her apartment while she slept).
40 Marital rape is not uncommon in abusive relationships. See, e.g., Fennell, 630
F.Supp. at 457 (wife raped by husband m hospital while she was recovering from surgery);
19921
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
it off as long as possible.41 Her goal at this stage is to cope with and survive
the situation rather than escape it.42 After the battered woman is repeatedly
subjected to the cycle of violence, she comes to believe that her batterer is
omnipotent,43 and that no one can help her.44
The tension between the partners often dissipates after the severe beating
incident and the final phase of the cycle begins. The batterer becomes loving
and nurturing toward his mate, trying to make amends for the pain he has
caused her.45 The batterer begs forgiveness and promises to change. 46 For the
battered woman, the partner's behavior reinforces the reasons she was first
attracted to him and the reasons she loves him.47 This period of loving
contrition inevitably deteriorates, however, and the tension-building cycle
see also ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KILL 95-103 (1987); Mather,
supra note 6, at 555 (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATFERED WOMAN SYNDROME
149 (1984).4 1 WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 44.
42 See Walker, Beyond the Juror's Ken, supra note 34, at 6. A battered woman will
frequently also bide from her friends and family while healing from a severe battering
incident, perhaps out of shame. See Sargeant, supra note 16, at 17.
43 This belief in the batterer's omnipotence may survive even the batterer's own death.
See People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831 (Colo. 1989) (it took hours for defendant to realize her
batterer was dead); State v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 215 (I1. Ct. App. 1983) (syndrome
evidence admitted to show defendant dismembered husband's body to prevent him from
coming back to life to retaliate); see also Mather, supra note 6, at 554 n.71.
44 Walker, Beyond the Juror's Ken, supra note 34, at 8-9.
Tis is often a very real fear. The police are frequently of little help in discouraging
further battering, because the batterer is often not arrested and the police are unable or
unwilling to provide protection to the victim of the abuse. Battered women in California and
New York instituted class actions against the police, alleging that the police customarily
denied women protection by refusig to assist battered women or arrest their husbands. See
Scott v. Hart, No. C-76-2395 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1976) (unpublished opinon); Bruno v.
Codd, 396 N.Y.2d 974 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), aft'd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979). Both
lawsuits were resolved by consent decree. See generally Kathleen Waits, The Crmnal
Justice System's Response to Battenng: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions,
60 WASH. L. REv 267 (1985).
45 WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 44.
46 See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 386 S.E.2d 129, 130 (Ga. 1989) ("During the
courtship and their marrage, the deceased would frequently beat [defendant] Chapman, and
he would apologize and say that he would not do it again."); WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE,
supra note 28, at 44.
47 A battered woman's reluctance to leave the relationslp may be the result of
intermittent reinforcement: the pleasures of the contrition period may provide enough
positive reinforcement to keep the battered woman in the relationship despite the abuse.
Grace M. Long & J. Regis McNamara, Paradoxical Punishment as It Relates to the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 13 BEHAvIOR MODIFIcATION 192, 197 (1989); WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 47.
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begins anew. As the cycles recur within the abusive relationship, the violence
escalates in severity and acute beatings occur more frequently 48
B. "Learned Helplessness"
Another hallmark of the battered woman syndrome is "learned
helplessness." 49 This condition has been described by one court as a
"psychological torpor."50 Battered women manifest learned helplessness after
they have been subjected to random, variable abuse with or without
provocation. Because the battered woman is unable to predict the effect her
actions might have on her battering spouse, she eventually learns that she has
no control over the situation or escape from the pam.51 Reacting with passivity
becomes her best defense.
Though it may seem to outsiders that the battered woman could simply
leave her lover or spouse, a victim of battered woman syndrome does not
perceive that to be an option.52 The battered woman's belief that escape from
48 See WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 40, at 43-44, 150
(citing "Wife Beating: The Silent Cnme," TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 23); Susan L.
Podebradsky, & Mary E. Triggiano-Hunt, Comment, An Overmew of Defense of Battered
Women From a Postconvction Perspective, 4 Wis. WOMEN'S L. 95, 97 (1988).
49 See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 37. A battered woman may
have developed learned helplessness as the result of earlier life experiences, through
childhood abuse, perhaps, or through early socialization into strict sex roles. Id. The earlier
a person falls into a pattern of learned helplessness, the more difficult it is for that person to
terminate a violent relationship.
50 State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 386 (NJ. 1984) (Handler, I., concurring and
dissenting). Another court has succinctly described learned helplessness as "a condition in
which the woman is psychologically locked into her situation due to economic dependence
on the man, an abiding attachment to him, and the failure of the legal system to adequately
respond to the problem." State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (Wash. 1984).
51 See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 50. Research performed on
dogs by Martin Seligman clarified the concept of learned helplessness. In the experiments,
dogs were put in cages from which they could not escape and were administered random
electric shocks. The dogs learned there was nothing they could do to control the
administration of the shocks and stopped trying to escape. Researchers discovered the dogs
were developing coping mechanisms rather than expending energy m what they had come
to learn were futile escape attempts. The dogs lay in their own excrement to partially
insulate themselves from the shocks, and they chose the least conductive part of the cage to
lie in. When researchers opened the cages and tried to teach the dogs to escape, the dogs
resisted. They had developed a "learned helplessness" response, which was to rely on
proven coping strategies rather than efforts to escape that the dogs had previously found to
be ineffective. Only when the dogs were forcibly and repeatedly dragged to the cage exits
did they abandon their coping strategies in favor of escape. See u.
52 Case law is replete with examples of battered women who have been threatened by
their abusive mates if they express an intent to leave. See, e.g., Fleming v. Huch, 924 F.2d
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the situation is impossible may be based in reality-the woman may truly have
no place to go 3-or she may fear worse battering if her mate finds her.54 She
may have in fact attempted to leave her batterer m the past, only to be cajoled
or forced back into their home.55 The woman's traditional family values often
keep her m the relationship, 56 as does the hope that her mate will change. 57
The battered woman's poor self-image and low self-esteem contribute to
her feeling of helplessness.58 She experiences guilt over her inability to stop or
avoid the violence and may believe she is somehow at fault and deserves the
679, 679 (7th Cir. 1991) (defendant testified that her abusive husband, upon hearing that
she intended to leave him, responded, "[tihe only way you will leave me is feet first").
53 A battered woman may, for instance, have few friends In the community, or may
lack family support. It might be that her family and friends, and even the police, are
hesitant to get involved In a domestic dispute. Often the batterer is jealous of any time his
mate spends outside the family and will impose a forced isolation upon her, cutting off her
associations with friends and family. See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at
76, 103. In addition, the battered woman may lack financial resources, though this is not
umversally true. See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 106, 113.54 Cynthia L. Coffee, Note, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Adnmssibility of
Epert Testiony Concerung the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J. FAM. L. 373, 379 n.40
(1986). In fact, m a majority of spousal homicide cases, police have previously been
summoned to the home. Margaret Howard, Husband-Wife Homcide: An Essay from a
Family Law Perspective, 49 1. LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 63, 69-70 (1986). Clearly,
involving the authorities does not guarantee protection from further, or even heightened,
abuse.
Statistics show that police do not make arrests as often in domestic assault cases as they
do in nondomestic assaults. See Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, (10th Cir. 1988); see
also Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989) (batterer and girlfriend were
both police officers; other officers repeatedly declined to file reports against batterer when
summoned to the scene of an abusive incident).
The lack of police protection may stem in part from the fact that, as studies m England
have shown, police are among those groups with the Ighest incidence of wife beating. See
WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 19, at 24.55 There is a good chance that the abusive partner has threatened to kill or maim the
woman if she attempts to leave hun. See, e.g., WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note
28, at 47; Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meamng of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men
in Self-Defense, 8 HARV WOMEN's LJ. 121, 133-34 (1985). Experts in the field have
compiled many case histories replete with instances in which a battered wife left her
husband only to have him pursue her and subject her to an even more brutal beating. See,
e.g., MARTIN, supra note 19, at 76-79.
56 The stigma of divorce and the humiliation of having "failed" in marriage reinforce
these traditional values. See MARTIN, supra note 19, at 81-83. Spouse abuse, contrary to
what one might expect, is not confined to any single ethic, religious or economc group;
rather, it crosses socioeconomic boundaries. DANIEL J. SONKIN, Er AL., THE MALE
BATTERER: A TREATMENT APPROACH 41 (1985).57 WALCER, TERFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 45.
58 Id. at 102.
[Vol. 53:363
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
battermg.59 Battered women also may suffer from severe stress reactions such
as anxiety, depression, and general suspiciousness. 60 Fear rules battered
women's lives, even during relatively calm periods m their relationships. 61 The
battered woman never knows what nught trigger another battering incident.
C. Defimng the "Syndrome" and Counteracting the Myth of the Battered
Woman
The term "battered woman" 62 was defined by Lenore Walker, one of the
foremost researchers m the field of domestic violence, as one who has
repeatedly been physically, sexually, or seriously psychologically abused by
her partner m an intimate relationship. 63 The abuse is often a result of the
husband's or lover's attempt to coerce the woman into doing that which she
does not want to, without regard for the woman's rights or wishes. 64 The
woman must have undergone the "cycle of violence" at least two times to be
considered a battered woman.65 The definition of a battered woman and the
diagnosis of the syndrome of which she is a victim emphasize the normalcy of
her reaction to the continued abuse. The syndrome has been termed "a terrified
human being's normal response to an abnormal and dangerous situation." 66
Because the psychological reality for battered women greatly differs from
the myths and misunderstandings about them, eyewitness testimony as to the
abuse they have suffered generally is not enough to explain the battered
woman's reaction to the abuse. Expert testimony on the syndrome can be
crucial when the mental state of the battered woman is at issue m a tral.67
59 Id. at 102-43.60 See WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 19, at 31-35.
61 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 680 (Ga. 1981).
62 The term "battered woman" should perhaps be changed to "battered spouse" or
"battered mate" to account for its current usage. At least one male defendant has attempted
to introduce battered spouse syndrome m his defense. See State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1
(Mo. 1991). Evidence of the syndrome is not limited to heterosexual relationships, either. In
Los Angeles Mumcipal Court, a woman was charged with the assault of her lesbian lover.
The prosecution presented evidence of the battered woman syndrome to explain why the
victim first reported the battering, then recanted her story after reconciling with the batterer.
See Lesnan Convicted of Beating Her Lover, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 30, 1990, at B2,
col. 1.
63 See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 35, 102.
64 Id. at 35.
65 See WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 19, at 70.
66 WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 180.
67 Some feminist scholars note that such myths include that battered women voluntarily
participate m and enjoy battering relationsips, that the beatings are probably justified, and
that police provide adequate protection for battered women. See Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Equal Rights to Tnal for Women. Sex Bias in the Law of Selp-Defense, 15 HARV C.R.-C.L.
L. REV 623, 625 (1980). See generally, WALKER, THE BATrERME WOMAN, supra note
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Testimony regarding learned helplessness can help explain to a jury why a
battered woman did not seek help after an acute battering incident. Without the
testimony, prosecutors may successfully use a defendant's failure to seek help
as evidence that the abuse was less severe than the battered woman claims.6 3
Expert testimony on the syndrome can also explain why the woman did not
simply leave her lover or spouse. The woman's perception of being trapped, as
well as her belief that her batterer would follow and retaliate against her for
having left him, becomes understandable to a jury when put m context by
syndrome testimony 69 An expert could explain why a woman under such
circumstances might feel in extreme danger even when an abusive partner does
not have a weapon in hand. 70 An explanation of the spiraling violence in an
abusive relationslp also puts the battered woman's perception of mminent
harm in the proper context.
II. INTRODUc'ON OF SYNDROME TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
Testimony on the battered woman syndrome71 was not introduced in
criminal trials until the latter half of the 1970s.72 The timing of this event was
no coincidence. It was only then that the women's movement began putting
labels like "battering" and "marital rape" on behaviors that, only a few years
before, went unstudied and undiscussed m academic circles. 73 It was also at
19, at 18-30 (discussing myths about battered women). But see James R. Acker & Hans
Toch, Battered Women, Straw Men, and Expert Testmony: Coment on State v. Kelly, 21
CpIM. L. BULL. 125, 139 (1985) (arguing that Lenore Walker's "myths" may themselves
be mythical).
68 See Crocker, supra note 55, at 132-34.
69 See infra notes 101-39 and accompanying text.
70 See Crocker, supra note 55, at 134-35 (noting that because a battered woman has
been exposed over and over to the batterer's abuse, she can recognize the signs of a
particularly intense attack; furthermore, she may feel a need to use extreme force because
her choices are to be completely passive or to stop the beating altogether); see also People
v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (savagery of victim's beating convinced
defendant he would kill her tlns time; while he rested, she shot and killed him).
71 The battered woman syndrome has been given different names by courts. See, e.g.,
State v. Dannels, 734 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1987) ("abused spouse syndrome"); State v. Baker,
424 A.2d 171, 173 (N.H. 1980) ("battered wife syndrome"); State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d
161, 163 (Wis. 1983) ("battered spouse syndrome").
72 See Rosen, supra note 6, at 14-15. Prior to the studies on battered woman
syndrome in the late 1970s, most women who killed their abusers either pleaded not guilty
by reason of insanity or simply pleaded guilty to the charge. See Elizabeth M. Schneider &
Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical
or Sexual Assault, 4 WoMEN'S RTs. L. REP 149, 149 (1978) (noting that most women who
claimed insanity were routinely convicted).
73 KRsn YLLo & MIcHELE BOGRAD, FEMINIST PERSPECriVS ON WIFE ABUSE 11
(1988).
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this time that the National Organization for Women established a Task Force
on Battered Women and Household Violence.74 Shelters and support groups
for victims of domestic violence sprang up around the country as the specter ofint y violence was brought to light.75
Despite its relatively recent introduction into the criminal justice system,
however, the syndrome figures into many cases today 76 Testimony on the
syndrome may be used to show that the battered-woman defendant was insane
at the time she assaulted or killed her mate.77 It may also be introduced to
show that the defendant had "dinmished responsibility," 78 or that there was an
"apparent necessity" 79 for the crime.80 The defendant may also seek to
introduce syndrome testimony simply to support her credibility 81 Syndrome
testimony is presented most often, however, in crininal trials to prove that the
defendant acted in self-defense when she used physical force against her
husband or lover with fatal results. 82
In order to admit syndrome testimony for any of these purposes, a
defendant must clear several evidentiary hurdles. The issue of whether expert
testimony on the syndrome is admissible is usually addressed in an evidentiary
74 SUSAN SCHECTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VisioNs AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATrERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 1-2, 53-58 (1982).
75 YIio & BoGRAD, supra note 73, at 11.
76 Syndrome testimony has even found its way into civil trials. See Curtis v. Curtis,
No. 14514 (Blame County Dist. Ct., May 18, 1990) (plaintiff sued former live-m boyfriend
for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress; was awarded compensatory and
punitive damages); Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, No. 603054 (Cal. San Diego Super. Ct.
November 2, 1990) (wife brought personal injury claun against husband after two years of
abuse; was awarded substantial compensatory damages). See generally Sargeant, supra note
16, at 18-19.
7 7 See Schneider, supra note 67, at 630. When a defendant uses syndrome testimony to
prove that she is not guilty by reason of insanity, she faces the possibility of confinement rn
a mental hospital, which is obviously a risk best avoided if another use of the testimony is
possible. See Rocco C. Cipparone, Comment, The Defense of Battered Women Who Kill,
135 U. PA. L. REV 427,445 (1987).
78 See C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Mental or Emotional Condition as Dinumshzng
Responsibiliyfor Cmne, 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968 & Supp. 1991) (collecting cases).
79 See, e.g., People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
80 Many states, however, do not recognze such defenses and consequently do not
admit syndrome testimony to prove them. See e.g., State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d 421, 427
(La. Ct. App. 1985) (Louisiana does not recognize doctrine of diminished responsibility).
81 See, e.g., Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1991)
(battered woman stated at scene of her rape and before grand jury that intercourse was non-
consensual; prosecution sought at trial to use testimony on the syndrome to show why she
recanted at trial); Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F.Supp. 451, 460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1985); State v.
Dannels, 734 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1987); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984)
(testimony on syndrome could reinforce defendant's credibility by explaining why she failed
to escape the abuse); State v. Hanson, 793 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).82 See, e.g., Cipparone, supra note 77, at 428.
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hearing on a motion m limme.83 At this hearing, the defendant must make a
formal offer of proof84 as to her ability to establish, through her own testimony
or that of other witnesses, that she is a "battered woman," 85 that the proposed
"expert" is qualified to give his or her expert opion,86 and that the particular
testimony is relevant and otherwise admissible. A land mine for the defendant
may lie under each one of these evidentiary and procedural steps.
Initially, courts often excluded testimony on the syndrome because it did
not meet the requirements for admission of expert testimony at trial.87 In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, Dyas v. United States88 stated the prevailing test
for introducing expert testimony at trial. Under Dyas, the testimony offered
had to satisfy three requirements: (1) the subject matter had to be so
distinctively related to some science as to be beyond the ken of the average
layman; (2) the expert witness must have had sufficient knowledge and
experience in that field to make it appear that his or her opinion would
probably aid the trier of fact in his or her search for the truth; and (3) the state
of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge must have permitted a reasonable
opinion to be asserted by the expert. 89
Courts initially were reluctant to admit expert testimony on the syndrome
under the third prong of this test in the absence of solid and credible evidence
that the syndrome was capable of scientific proof and definition. 90 Until the
83 See, e.g., Pugh v. State, 401 S.E.2d 270, 271 n.1 (Ga. 1991).
84 See, e.g., State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. 1984).
85 See, e.g., Pruitt v. State, 296 S.E.2d 795 (Ga. 1982) (expert testimony excluded as
irrelevant when defendant failed to demonstrate on the record that she was a battered
woman).
86 See, e.g., Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1991) (proposed expert
who had doctorate in psychology and experience working with battered women was
qualified to give expert opinion on battered woman syndrome).87 See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
88 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977).
89 See u, Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F.Supp. 451, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying Dyas
test).
Since Dyas, the relaxed requirements for expert testimony as set forth in Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 have been adopted by most states: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinon or otherwise." FED. R. EviD. 702.
See, e.g., Dianna J. Ensign, Note, Links Between the Battered Woman Syndrome and
the Battered OdIld Syndrome: An Argunent for Consistent Standards in the Admssibility of
Expert Testmny in Family Abuse Cases, 36 WAYNE L. REv 1619, 1631 (1990).
90 See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981), overruled by State v.
Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990). The scientific credibility of a field is most often judged
by the number of published articles on the subject, the number of cases that have allowed
testimony based upon the theory, whether others in the field have duplicated the results of
the research and testimony by others in the field, and whether the theory has gained general
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scientific proof and definition of the syndrome were shown, courts also had
trouble considering such testimony as being beyond the ken of the average
layman.91 The watershed case regarding the scientific recognition and
acceptance of battered woman syndrome was Ibn-Tamas v. United States.92 In
lbn-Tamas, a District of Columbia court concluded for the first time that the
syndrome theory was beyond the ken of the average layman and helpful to hn
in his search for truth, 93 because it included concepts like "learned
helplessness" that belied common nusconceptions about battered women and
because it was well supported by credible scientific research.94 Since ibn-
Tamas, most states have come to accept the conclusion that the syndrome is
worthy of expert testimony at trial *95
As the syndrome itself has become accepted, the next barrier to the
admission of syndrome testimony generally arises from rulings on the
relevancy of the testimony 96 It is clear that if the defendant is unable to
establish that she was physically, sexually, or psychologically abused by the
acceptance. See Meredith Brnegar Cross, Comment, The Expert as Educator: A Proposed
Approach to the Use of Battered Woman Syndrome Expert Tesnimony, 35 VAND. L. REV
741, 745 (1982); see also Michael A. Buda & Teresa L. Butler, The Battered Wife
Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestc Violence, 23 L FAM. L. 359, 387 n.99 (1985).
91 See Pugh v. State, 401 S.E.2d 270 (Ga. 1991); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374
(Wyo. 1981).
92 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
93 One femmnst theorist suggests that "[the decision to exclude expert testimony m
[cases involving rape trauma syndrome and battered woman syndrome] reflects an
assumption that issues of importance to women are simple, 'common' matters that everyone
understands, rather than 'techmcal,' male issues that might require expert testimony." Kit
Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV 413, 444 (1991).9 4 See supra Part I.
95 See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. Ct. App. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989); State v. Hanson, 793 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990) ("the scientific basis and relevancy of such testimony in proper cases is now well
established"); cf Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (recognizing the validity of battered woman syndrome evidence "even where
traditional self-defense theory may seem to fit the situation only imperfectly"). But see State
v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981) (state of art not sufficiently developed to warrant
testimony under guise of expertise), ovemded by State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio
1990) (battered woman syndrome now a matter of commonly accepted scientific
knowledge, and therefore admissible to prove self-defense); Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d
565 ('ex. Ct. App. 1985) (reasonable person's perception of fear is within ken of average
juror), rev'd, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crm. 1988); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo.
1981) (defendant failed to demonstrate that state of the art would permit reasonable expert
opinion).
96 See, e.g., Kelly, 478 A.2d at 373. In determining relevance, a court must decide
whether the evidence renders an inference desired by the offering party more probable than
it would be without the evidence. FED. R. EvID. 401.
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victim, syndrome testimony is without foundation and irrelevant.97 The
relevancy determination becomes more complicated, however, when the
defendant establishes that she is a battered woman but offers syndrome
testimony in a nontraditional, self-defense case. When the underlying evidence
reveals, for instance, that a batterer was at rest or asleep at the time of the
offense, many courts have excluded syndrome testimony when offered to prove
that the defendant acted m self-defense. 98
This reluctance is best explained by reference to the legal requirements for
self-defense. To establish a valid claim of self-defense, the accused must show
that (1) she reasonably believed herself to be m imminent danger of death or
great bodily harm at the time of the offense;99 (2) she used no more than the
97 See, e.g., Pruitt v. State, 296 S.E.2d 795 (Ga. 1982).
98 See, e.g., People v. Ans, 264 Cal.Rptr. 167, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant
killed sleeping husband after he severely beat her); Chapman v. State, 367 S.E.2d 541, 542
(Ga. 1988) (battered wife shot husband while he was bathing); Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d
659 (Ind. App. 1982) (batterer shot while sitting on couch); State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601
(Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (battered wife killed husband while sleeping); State v. Hundley, 693
P.2d 475, 475-76 (Kan. 1985) (battered wife shot husband while he sat on bed across
room); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. 1986) (battered wife shot husband while he
rested after beating her); People v. Enick, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552, 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
(defendant killed sleeping husband following hours of abuse); People v. Torres, 488
N.Y.S.2d 358, 360-61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (battered wife shot husband in back while he
sat m chair); People v. Powell, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628-29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (defendant
killed her ex-husband as he slept after being held at gunpoint by him), aff'd, 442 N.Y.S.2d
645 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983) (battered
wife stabbed husband while sleeping after night of abuse); Commonwealth v. Grove, 526
A.2d 369, 372 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (battered wife shot husband while he was sleeping);
State v. Aucom, 756 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. 1988) (battered woman shot batterer while he
slept); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 313-14 (Wash. 1984) (after finding her estranged
husband m her house despite restraining order, defendant killed husband as he rested, based
on prior death threats by him); State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 164-65 (Wis. 1983)
(defendant killed sleeping husband following years of abuse of her and her children).
99 States may have either an objective, "reasonable man" standard by which to judge
the reasonableness of the actor's fear or a subjective standard, by which only the
defendant's actual fear is assessed m determining whether she acted m self-defense. The
objective standard is heavily criticized by commentators, see, e.g., Shad, supra note 15, at
1169, and was even the basis for reversing a defendant's conviction m State v. Wanrow,
559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977). In states that still use an objective standard, it would seem
incompatible to admit testimony regarding the reasonableness of an abused woman's fear of
her mate. At least one court has acknowledged, however, that m most states which employ
the objective standard, courts still take into consideration characteristics of the defendant
which might engender reasonable fear m a battered woman. See Commonwealth v. Watson,
431 A.2d 949, 952 (Pa. 1981). The Watson court recognized that the objective versus
subjective test for reasonableness is a sort of fiction. After Watson, Pennsylvania adopted an
"objective" standard which takes into account how a reasonably prudent battered woman
would have perceived and reacted to the victim's behavior. See Commonwealth v.
Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 784 (Pa. 1989). Similarly, New Mexico has adopted a "hybrid"
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amount of force necessary in order to save herself from the perceived Imminent
danger; (3) she was not the aggressor; and (4) she did not violate any duty to
retreat from or avoid the danger. 100 Expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome can be used to support most of these elements of a self-defense
claim.
The expert testimony may explain why a battered woman reasonably
believed that she was in munment danger of death or great bodily harm at the
time of the offense.10' Specifically, it can show how her experience with the
cycle of violence and prolonged abuse shaped her perception of the situation.'12
The syndrome theory explains a reasonable person's response to sustained
abuse; however, it is also relevant to the question of whether the defendant's
actions were reasonable under the circumstances. 10 3 Testimony on learned
helplessness can help jurors understand why a battered woman resorted to
deadly violence rather than trying to escape from or avoid the perceived
standard of reasonableness for use m such cases. See State v. Callegos, 719 P.2d 1268
(N.M. 1986).
Commentators generally endorse this idea of a "reasonable battered woman" standard
for use in states with an objective definition of reasonableness. See, e.g., Buda & Butler,
supra note 90, at 359; Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Clamns, 67
OR. L. REV. 393, 414-16 (1988); Shad, supra note 15, at 1173; but see Crocker, supra
note 55, at 152 (arguing that this prejudices battered women who do not necessarily meet all
the standard attributes of battered woman syndrome; recommends a standard of
reasonableness to be used for women m general).
100 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUsTIN W SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw 454 (2d ed.
1986). A homicide committed in self-defense is a justifiable homicide as opposed to an
excusable homicide. Corrpare, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 195 (1991) with § 197 (1991).
Excuses for homicide include accident and insanity. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL
LAwDEFEsEs 280 (1984).
The issue is more complicated than this, however. Some states distinguish between
"perfect" and "imperfect" self-defense. In California, for instance, perfect self-defense
requires both subjective honesty and objective reasonableness m the belief of imminent
harm. If proven, perfect self-defense completely exonerates the accused. See People v.
Ars, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). Imperfect self-defense requires only
subjective honesty and negates malice aforethought, reducing the homicide to voluntary
manslaughter. Id.
101 See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988) (syndrome testimony
"relevant to determination of the reasonableness of the defendant's perception of danger");
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 816-17 (N.D. 1983). But see People v. Ans, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 167, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (testimony relevant to issue of subjective belief, but not
relevant to issue of objective reasonableness).
102 See, e.g., Ans, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
103 See supra Part IC. See also Stewart, 763 P.2d at 577; State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364, 375-77 (NJ. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 369 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1985).
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danger.104 Syndrome testimony can also account for the failure to seek help
and for delay in reporting abuse.105 The cycle theory of violence can explain
why a battered woman's use of deadly force was not excessive.106
In traditional self-defense cases, many courts have recognized that
syndrome testimony is relevant for these purposes and should be admitted. In
State v. Kelly, 107 for example, the evidence showed that the defendant had been
abused by her husband for nearly all of their twenty-five year marriage.108 On
the day of the killing, Mr. Kelly attacked his wife m public, punching and
hitting her, biting her leg, and choking her to near unconsciousness. 109 A
crowd gathered, and the two were separated by members of the crowd. 11°
104 In Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377, for example, the court of appeals noted that at trial the
prosecutor had reinforced certain myths about battered women. In cross-examining the
defendant regarding occasions when the victim had temporarily moved out of the family
home, the prosecutor repeatedly asked the defendant: "You wanted him back, didn't you?"
L The court in Kelly noted that "[t]he [state's] implication was clear: domestic life could
not have been too bad if she wanted hun back." ILd. The court ruled the expert testimony
admissible to show the defendant's reasons for not having left her husband despite the
beatings she suffered at his hands. "After hearing the expert [testimony], instead of saying
Gladys Kelly could not have been beaten up so badly for if she had, she certainly would
have left, the jury could conclude that her failure to leave was very much part and parcel of
her life as a battered wife. The jury could conclude that instead of casting doubt on the
accuracy of her testimony about the severity and frequency of prior beatings, her failure to
leave actually reinforced her credibility." Id. at 378.
In Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the court
also ruled that expert testimony on the syndrome was admissible because without it "a jury
would not understand why [defendant] would remain [with her husband]."
105 See State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165, 1170 (Wash. 1988).
106 In State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977), which did not involve a battered
woman, the court noted that defendant was significantly smaller than the deceased and that
she had a broken leg at the time of the attack. The Wanrow court found that defendant's
response to the perceived danger was different than that of a robust person, and that it was
not reasonable to expect a person in defendant's physical circumstances to defend herself
without a weapon against an intoxicated, much larger attacker.
A woman's disadvantage in size may contribute to the need for and use of deadly
force. Although women are socialized not to use weapons, a battered woman may learn that
weapons are necessary after numerous attempts to defend herself unarmed. See Schneider,
supra note 67, at 633; see also Catherine A. Mackinnon, Toward Fernimst Junsprudence,
34 SrAN. L. REV 703, 732 (1982) ("Women thus perceive the need and do need to resort
to deadly force, [and] are more threatened than a similarly situated man, largely because
they are less able to care for themselves than they would be if they were trained [in self-
defense] the way men are trained"); Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fa. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (defendant's husband said, "I see that knife. I ain't seared of that knife. You
don't have as much strength as me").
107 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. Ct. App. 1984).
108 Id. at 369.
109 Id.
110 Id.
[Vol. 53:363
BATERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Moments later, Mr. Kelly came running toward Mrs. Kelly with his hands
raised.'"1 Mrs. Kelly, afraid that her husband nught have armed himself m the
meantime, pulled a pair of scissors from her purse and stabbed him. 112
Expert testimony on the syndrome was offered to explain the
reasonableness of Mrs. Kelly's belief m imminent danger, as well as why she
did not leave her abusive environment.113 A juror unfamiliar with the
syndrome might assume that the defendant was free to leave her husband at any
time and that the defendant used excessive force when she wielded scissors to
fend off her husband, since he apparently had no weapon at the time he ran at
her. An expert on the syndrome could point out that defendant's husband had
just tried to strangle her in public. After years of experiencing his beatings,
Mrs. Kelly may have felt that the abuse had escalated to the point that her
husband would truly kill her this time. Her past experience with him would
have led her to reasonably believe that without a weapon, she would be no
match for him.
While courts have become very receptive to the admission of expert
testimony on the syndrome in traditional, confrontational self-defense cases like
Kelly, this testimony is even more valuable to the defendant, yet less frequently
admitted, m nontraditional self-defense cases. It is the immnence requirement
that poses the problem in these cases. 114 In State v. Allery, 115 for example,
Mrs. Allery had again been severely abused for years by her husband.1 16 After
five years of marriage, she got a temporary restraining order against her
husband and initiated divorce proceedings. 117 One night, she came home to
find her husband lying on the couch in the living room, despite the restraining
order in effect. 18 She testified that he said to her, "'I guess I'm just going to
have to kill you sonofabitch. Did you hear me that time?'" 119 Mrs. Allery fled
"IId
.
112 Id. Of course, this is the defendant's version of the facts. On their face, these facts
would seem capable of supporting a traditional self-defense clama. The State, on the other
hand, intended to show that it was the defendant who started the scuffle, that it was Mrs.
Kelly who was pulled off Mr. Kelly by bystanders, that she said she would kill hun and
chased after him, and, upon catching up with him, stabbed him with the scissors. Id. at 369
n.1.
113 Id. at 377.
114 See, e.g., State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985) (conviction reversed when
jury instructed as to "immediate" danger rather than "imminent").
115 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984).
116 Defendant had been subjected to many beatings, including perodic pistol
whippings and assaults with knives. Alery, 682 P.2d at 312-13. She was once hospitalized
after her husband hit her m the head with a tire iron. Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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to a bedroom and tried unsuccessfully to escape through a window.120 She
heard a noise from the kitchen and thought her husband was getting a life.121
She took a shotgun from the bedroom and went to the kitchen, from which she
shot her husband as he lay on the couch.122
Mrs. Allery offered expert testimony on the syndrome to inforn the jury of
the mentality and behavior of battered women, to demonstrate how she could
have perceived herself to be in immnent danger at the time of the shooting,
and to explain why she had remained for so long in the abusive relationship. 123
The trial court excluded the testimony. 124 On review, however, the court of
appeals found that the testimony "explaining why a person suffering from the
battered woman syndrome would not leave her mate, would not inform police
or friends, and would fear increased aggression against herself would be
helpful to a jury in understanding a phenomenon not within the competence of
an ordinary lay person." 125 An objective, uninformed view of the facts shows
that the victim was unarmed and making no attempt to harm the defendant at
the time she shot him. In the context of their abusive relationship, however, the
defendant had already been hospitalized once after a brutal beating and had
been assaulted so often that she knew her husband would not hesitate to do so
again. Furthermore, she had finally taken steps to end the abusive relationship,
and feared that this might be enough provocation for him to finally kill her.
Under the circumstances, the danger could clearly appear muninent to
defendant, and the court ultimately found that expert testimony was necessary
to explain why 126
120 Id
121 Id. at 313-14.
122 Id. at 314.
123 Id. at 315.
124 Id. at 313.
125 Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
126 Id. The Allery court apparently believed that, as one commentator has put it, a
"very narrow view of reasonableness [of a battered woman's fear of ininment death]
defeats a potentially valid claim of self-defense." Mather, supra note 6, at 571.
The concept of imminency has been broadened m contexts other than that of battered
women, of course. In People v. Garcia, 126 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), cert.
dented, 426 U.S. 911 (1976), for example, Inez Garcia was raped and beaten by two men.
The attackers threatened to return and rape her again. Garcia went to get a gun from her
home and followed her attackers, fatally shooting one of them. The jury was allowed to
hear testimony of the rape and the rapists' threat to return. The jury found that Garcia had
acted m self-defense based on the rapists' threat, rather than out of vengeance for the
already-perpetrated rape. Garcia was acquitted.
One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that a standard of self-defense should
be adopted that does not have an mimmency requirement. See Sarah Baseden Vandenbraak,
Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive Force to Prevent Inirmnaital Assaults, 10 RuT.-CAM.
L.. 643, 651-53 (1979). Another believes that it would be preferable to expand the
definition of voluntary manslaughter to include battered woman cases (when the woman
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While the Allery court determined that the expert testimony on the
syndrome should have been admitted to show why Mrs. Allery believed that
she was m imminent danger, even though her husband lay prone m the other
room, many other courts have barred testimony under similar circumstances. In
People v. Aris,127 for example, the trial court excluded expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome which was offered by the defendant to prove certain
elements of self-defense. Many defense witnesses testified that Mr. Aris had
beaten his wife repeatedly during their ten year mamage.128 Mrs. Aris testified
that, on the night of the killing, her husband beat her and threatened that "'he
didn't think he was going to let [her] live till the morning.' ' 129 Ten minutes
after he fell asleep, Mrs. Aris went next door to get some ice to ease the pain
of the blows she had sustained to her face.130 While she was there, she found a
handgun on the top of the refrigerator and took it back to her home with
her.131 When she returned to the bedroom, Mrs. Ars allegedly thought to
herself that she "'had to do it" because she "felt when he woke up that he was
then going to hurt [her] very badly or even kill [her]. " 132 She then shot her
husband five times in the back while he was asleep. 133
The Califorma Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of second-degree
murder entered by the trial court, holding that while it was error to exclude the
testimony on the issue of defendant's actual, subjective perception that she was
m danger, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 134 Moreover, the
court held that the testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible on the issue of the
objective reasonableness of the defendant's actions. 135 The testimony was only
relevant, the court reasoned, to the defendant's subjective state of mind at the
time of the offense. 136
Courts that exclude expert testimony on the syndrome fear that admission
of the evidence will send the wrong message to defendants and juries. 137 These
establishes she is a victim of the syndrome), rather than broaden the concept of immmency.
See Shad, supra note 15, at 1160.
127 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
128 Id. at 171.
129 1&.
130 I.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 In this latter respect, the court noted that its decision was contrary to at least two
other decisions holding that testimony on the syndrome is relevant to the issue of whether
the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner. Id. at 180 n.5
136 Id.
137 In some "nontraditional" cases, of course, the defendant's claim of imminence will
appear quite specious. See, e.g., Boyd v. State, 581 A.2d 1 (Md. 1990) (defendant paid
$1800 to dynamite her husband's car); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (defendant hired hit man to kill her estranged husband); State v. Dannels, 734
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courts are concerned that any liberality in the rules for admitting evidence on
the question of self-defense may bring about an erosion of the iuminence
requirement and thereby excuse conduct that in the past has been deemed a
crime.138 They also worry that evidence related to the victim's bad character
may sidetrack the jury from its task of determining whether the defendant
committed the charged offense into an unfocused just-desserts analysis. 139
These concerns, however, often overshadow some of the important and
legitimate benefits of the testimony m nontraditional cases. If the underlying
facts in the case reveal that the defendant shot her husband as he ran at her with
a knife, shouting "I'm going to kill you," testimony on the syndrome may be
unnecessary because the underlying facts reveal why the defendant perceived
herself to be in imminent harm. The testimony may be vital to the defense,
however, if the husband exhibited no outward signs of hostility at the time of
the offense. In this latter instance, syndrome evidence fills a gap left by the
underlying evidence. Specifically, it helps explain what is difficult for a
factfinder unfamiliar with the theory to understand: that the defendant
reasonably believed herself to be in imminent danger of death or great bodily
P.2d 188, 191-92 (Mont. 1987) (defendant lured two men to asphyxiate her husband during
a faked burglary of their motel room).
138 See, e.g., Ans, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (inmminent peril must appear to defendant to
be immediate and present and not merely prospective; sleeping husband cannot be imminent
danger); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13-16 (N.C. 1989) (court feared that when victim
was asleep at time of shooting, self-defense instruction would "expand our law of self-
defense beyond the limits of immediacy and necessity").
139 See Nomtan, 378 S.E.2d at 13-16; State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820
(N.D. 1983); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (NJ. 1984); Taylor v. Dawson, 888 F.2d
1124, 1131 (6th Cir. 1989) (testimony regarding threats and acts of violence by the victim
"tends to unfairly prejudice the prosecution by getting the idea across to the jury that the
deceased deserved to be killed"). State v. Jahnke, 682 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 1984)
("Although many people, and the public media, seem to be prepared to espouse the notion
that a victim of abuse is entitled to kill the abuser that they had special justification defense
is antithetical [sic] to the mores of modem civilized society"); Pienm v. State, 804 S.W.2d
258 (Tex. App. 1991); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981); State v. Dannels, 734
P.2d 188 (Mont. 1987); Pugh v. State, 401 S.E.2d 270, 272 (Ga. 1991) ("while evidence of
battered woman syndrome may be presented to the jury m an appropriate case, it is not a
separate defense but is part of the defense of justification").
Professor Holly Maguigan has also theorized that judges may resist letting m evidence
of the syndrome because they think battered women are claiming a special license to
murder rather than asserting a valid claim of self-defense. See Sargeant, supra note 16, at
17.
Commentators, too, sometimes refer to the battered woman syndrome as a defense
unto itself rather than an aid to fit a female defendant into the traditional concept of self-
defense. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 6, at 14-15; Elizabeth Vaughn & Maureen L. Moore,
The Battered Spouse Defense in Kentucky, 10 N. KY. L. REV 399, 399 (1983) (battered
woman defense is emerging as "akin to, but separate from, the more familiar and
established defenses of self-defense and diminished capacity").
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harm, and unable to escape from her situation, even though the batterer
appeared to be passive at the time of the offense. Without this testimony, the
factfinder is left to draw his or her own inferences from the underlying facts.
These inferences are likely to be skewed, however, because lay persons
generally labor under misconceptions about battered women.
Hm. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXCLUDING SYNDROME
EVIDENCE IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL
In the day-to-day application of the rules of evidence, a separate
consideration of constitutional rights is unnecessary The Constitution does not
incorporate the Federal Rules of Evidence; the exclusion of even relevant and
probative evidence, therefore, generally does not implicate constitutional
rights. 140
The proposed exclusion of evidence which is particularly reliable and
crucial to the defense, however, should serve "as a warning flag to trial judges
to weigh the fairness of their decision." 141 In all criminal trials the accused has
the right to present a defense.142 This right has long been recognized as
fundamental and essential to due process. 143 It is also protected by the
140 See, e.g., Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F Supp. 451, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (trial court
erroneously excluded expert testimony on battered woman syndrome because expert had
not personally interviewed defendant, but exclusion did not violate the Constitution because
evidence was not critical to the defense and exclusion was harmless error).
141 Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983).
142 See Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400
(1988); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973); Cool v. United States, 409
U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (per cunam);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
JEROLD H. IsRAEL, 3 CRuiINAL PROCEDURE § 23.3() (1984); Annotation, Accused's
Right, Under Federal Constitutional Sixth Amennent, To Compulsory Process for
Obtairng Witnesses i Accused's Favor-Supreme Court Cases, 98 L. ED. 2d 1074 (1988);
Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Consdudonal Guarantee
in Crmznal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV 713 (1976); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process
Gaure, 73 MICH. L. REV 71 (1974) [hereinafter "Westen, Compulsory Process"]; Peter
Westen, Compulsory Process 11, 74 MICH. L. REV 193 (1975) [hereinafter "Westen,
Compulsory Process "].
143 See Oamberr, 410 U.S. at 294 (exclusion of testimony that bore persuasive
assurances of trustworthiness violated defendant's due process right to present witnesses m
is own defense); Webb, 409 U.S. at 98 (judge's threatening remarks to defense witness
effectively drove the witness off of the stand and deprived the defendant of due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment); Clinton, supra note 142, at 747-801; see also
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (Due Process Clause guarantees the
defendant's right to discover the identity of government witnesses).
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Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment 144 because the right to
compel the appearance of witnesses has meaning only if it includes the right to
present the testimony of these witnesses.145
While the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, it appears from
other cases that this constitutional right to present a defense includes a right to
present expert testimony to establish a defense, subject to the same restrictions
outlined above. In People v. Watson,146 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
when expert testimony is deemed by the trial judge to be "crucial to a proper
defense," the accused has not only a right to present the testimony of the
expert, but also the right to public funds in order to secure the assistance of that
expert, if necessary 147 Similarly, m State v. Sims, 148 an Ohio Court of
Appeals found that if a polygraph examiner "is able to reach a conclusion
which favors defendant's view of the issues, [the defendant has the right to]
compulsory process for his testimony as a witness." 149 Professor Peter Westen
agrees that "it is scarcely conceivable that defendants could be constitutionally
denied the opportunity to call experts to give opiuon evidence about such
144 The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment reads as follows: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses m Ins favor "U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The extensive history of the Compulsory Process Clause is beyond the scope of this
Article. A reader who is interested m reading about tls should consult Professor Westen's
seminal works on the subject. See Westen, Compulsory Process, supra note 142; Westen,
Compulsory Process H, supra note 142; Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A
Unified Theory of Evidence for Cramnal Cases, 91 IIARv L. REV 56, 171 (1978).
145 See Lucas, 111 S. Ct. at 1747; Taylor, 484 U.S. at 409; Washngton, 388 U.S. at
19.
The relationshp between the Due Process and Compulsory Process Clauses is not
clear. See Ritchue, 480 U.S. at 55-56. For many years, the Supreme Court variously
ascribed the right to present a defense either to the Due Process Clause or the Compulsory
Process Clause without much explanation of its choice. Copare, e.g., Washington, 388
U.S. at 19 (Compulsory Process Clause) and Cool, 409 U.S. at 104 (Compulsory Process
Clause) with Clumbers, 410 U.S. at 294 (Due Process Clause) and Webb, 409 U.S. at 98
(Due Process Clause). Today, however, it is fairly clear that the Court views a criminal
defendant as having a single right to present a defense, with two constitutional sources: the
Due Process Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 409.
While the substantive differences between the Due Process and Compulsory Process
Clauses may be important when another right is at stake, see, e.g., Ritctue, 480 U.S. at 55-
56, the differences do not appear to be important in this context.
146 221 N.E.2d 645 (I. 1966).
147 Id.; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (Sixth Amendment
protects defendant's right to the production of "all evidence" at a criminal trial); People v.
Nichols, 388 N.E.2d 984 (1I. 1979); People v. Vines, 358 N.E.2d 72 (11. Ct. App. 1976);
People v. Glover, 273 N.E.2d 367 (I1. 1971).
148 369 N.E.2d 24 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
149 H at31.
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matters as fingerprints, bloodstains, sanity, and other matters that routinely
arise m criminal litigation."150
Under some circumstances, the exclusion of expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome implicates this constitutional right.151 For instance,
when the defendant offers expert testimony on the syndrome to prove that she
acted m self-defense m a murder or assault case she is, m effect, asserting this
right.152 If the trial court excludes the testimony, the exclusion may raise
constitutional as well as evidentiary concerns.153
Whether the exclusion violates the defendant's constitutional right depends,
however, not only upon the importance of the testimony to the defense but also
upon the state's countervailing interest m excluding the evidence. The right to
present a defense is not absolute.154 As the Supreme Court has explained, the
Sixth Amendment "'does not confer the right to present testimony free from
the legitimate demands of the adversanal system.'" 1 55 The accused, like the
150 Westen, Compulsory Process 1I, supra note 142, at 203.
151 See infra sections IHA-C.
152 In State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 376 (NJ. 1984), for instance, the court
recognized that expert testimony on the syndrome "protects due process rights by allowmg
[the accused] to offer testimony to establish a defense." The testimony "is aimed at an area
where the purported common knowledge of the jury may be very much mistaken, an area
where jurors' logic, drawn from their own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect
conclusion, an area where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their prior
conclusions as being common myths rather than common knowledge." Id. at 378.
153 See, e.g., zt& at 376 n.11; Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F Supp. 451, 460-62 (E.D.
Pa. 1985); Tourlakis v. Morms, 738 F. Supp. 1128, 1134-40 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is so important m some trials that a
failure to raise it as an issue when it is clearly applicable may constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Commonwealth v. McFadden, 587 A.2d 740 (Pa. 1991); State v.
Wickline, 399 S.E.2d 42 (W Va. 1990) (court considered, but declined to rule on
ineffective assistance claim); State v. Reneau, 804 P.2d 408 (N.M. 1990) (same).
154 See Chanbers, 410 U.S. at 295 (defendant's right to present testimony "may, m
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests m the criminal trial
process"); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44,55 (1987).
155 Nobes, 422 U.S. at 241. In Waslungton v. Texas, the Court reserved the issue of
whether a witness's valid assertion of a testimonial privilege could override the defendant's
right to present that witness's testimony m his defense. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 23 n.21.
Some courts have filled the vacuum left by Waslungton, holding that the state may
exclude testimony that is both favorable and material to the defense when the defense
witness asserts a valid privilege. See United States v. Khan, 728 F.2d 676, 678 (5th Cir.
1984); Valdez v. Winans, 738 F.2d 1087, 1089 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Moreno,
536 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1976); Wisconsm ex. rel. Monsoor v. Gagnon, 497 F.2d
1126, 1129 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1968). See
also United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 260 (5th Cir. 1982) (witness's valid claim of
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State, "must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed
to assure both fairness and reliability In the ascertainment of guilt and
mnocence.
" 156
There are few guidelines for determining when the defendant's right to
present a defense must bow to the state's interest In its rules of evidence or
procedure.1 57 In what follows, we examine some guidelines that do exist and
then consider whether, and if so how, these guidelines apply in cases in which
syndrome evidence has been excluded.
A. "Favorable" and "Matenal" Testimony
To establish a violation of the right to present a defense, a criminal
defendant must show at a rminmum that the excluded testimony would have
been both "favorable" and "material" to her defense. 158
The requirement that the testimony be "favorable" to the defense will
rarely be an obstacle.159 While it is conceivable that, in a given case, an expert
on the syndrome may give unfavorable or unhelpful testimony for the
immunity may be sufficient to overcome the defendant's interest m presenting witnesses to
establish a defense).
"IT]he Supreme Court [, however,] has never permitted a privilege to be asserted m
such a manner as to deny the defendant material evidence m his favor." Westen,
Compulsory Process H, supra note 142, at 229. In fact, the Supreme Court has suggested
that m direct conflicts between the privileges of witnesses and the rights of the accused, the
rights of the accused are "paramount." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974)
(defendant's right to confront witnesses against him overcame state's interest in preserving
anonymity ofjuvenile offender). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)
(executive privilege yields to need for criminal evidence). See generally Robert Weisburg,
Note, Defendant v. Watness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process Rights
Against Statutory Conmumcations Privileges, 30 SrAN. L. REV 935 (1978).156 Gumwbers, 401 U.S. at 302.
157 For a broader discussion of these guidelines, including a discussion of some that
are not directly relevant to this article, see Westen, Conpulsoy Process I, supra note 142,
at 194-234.
158 See Washington, 388 U.S. at 16; United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
858, 867 (1982) (defendant could not establish violation of his constitutional right to
compulsory process merely by showing that deportation of witnesses deprived him of their
testimony; he must "at least make some plausible showing of how their testimony would
have been both material and favorable to his defense"); Davis v. Jabe, 824 F.2d 483, 486-
87 (6th Cir. 1987) (trial court's decision to exclude testimony by defendant's brother was an
evidentiary error, but testimony was not "vital" or "critical" to the defense); Westen,
Compulsoy Process II, supra note 142, at 213-31. But see United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, Cir. 1.) (it would be unreasonable to require the
defendant, Aaron Burr, to show the relevance of missing testimony).
159 In other contexts, however, this requirement is very much an obstacle for the
defendant. See LaFave & Israel, supra note 142, at § 23.3(o at 20 (discussing aftermath of
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
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defendant, the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that the testimony will
be favorable is "a very slight one." 160 The defendant need only show that the
testimony would be "potentially useful" to her case. 16 1
The "materiality" requirement presents a greater obstacle to the defendant.
"Material" testimony is that which is so important and critical to the defense
that its exclusion would amount to prejudicial error. 162 If one can conclude that
the testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury, it is "material." 163
Evidence that is merely duplicative or of only tangential importance is not
"material" to the defense. 164
The seminal case of Waslungton v. Texas 165 illustrates the type of
testimony that may be "favorable" and "material" to the defense. In
Waslungton, the petitioner Jackie Washington sought to call as a witness at his
murder trial one Charles Fuller, who had already been convicted of the same
cnme. 166 Washington wanted to show that Fuller shot the victim and that he,
Washington, had attempted to prevent the shooting. 167 The prosecution,
however, successfully objected to Washington's offer of Fuller's testimony
under an arcane Texas rule of testimonial competence. The rule forbade the
defendant from calling as witnesses those persons charged as principals,
accomplices, or accessories m the same crune. 168 The asserted purpose of the
160 Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470, 476 (8th Cir. 1973).
161 Id. at. 476. See also Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867 (defendant "must at least
make some plausible showng of how [witness's] testimony would have been both material
and favorable to Is defense.") (emphasis added).
For a more extensive discussion of the requirement that the testimony be m the
defendant's favor, see Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 142, at 231-34.
162 See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868-70. The concept of "materiality" is not a
new one; it has long been part of due process analysis. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process when
that evidence is "material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution."); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794 (1972) (defendant will
prevail on Brady claim "where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material
either to guilt or to punishment"); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976)
("onussion must be evaluated m the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable
doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no
justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable
validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a
reasonable doubt.").
163 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (citing Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).
164 See, e.g., Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 871 (defendant failed to show that
testimony of deported witnesses would have been favorable and material to his defense).
165 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
166 Ld. at 16.
16 7 Id.
168 Id. at 17.
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rule was to prevent perjury. 169 The Supreme Court reversed Washington's
conviction, holding that the state rule violated the accused's Sixth Amendment
right to compulsory process. 170
The Court identified at least two reasons why the testimony was favorable
and material to Washington's defense. First, the witness had a unique
perspective on the events giving rise to the criminal charge. Fuller was
"physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally
observed." 171 Second, the witness's testimony was not only relevant, it was
potentially exculpatory. 17 2 If believed, Fuller's testimony would have absolved
Washington of responsibility for the crime.
These reasons apply with some force m the context of the battered woman
syndrome.173 Certainly, there is a factual difference between eyewitness
testimony of a coparticipant in a crime, such as that at issue m Waslungton, and
expert testimony on the syndrome. Nevertheless, these types of testimony are
similar m their purposes and effects. Both the coparticipant and the expert offer
an insight on the defendant's actions at the time of the offense. One perspective
is based upon personal experience and the other is based upon professional
analysis and experience. The expert informs the factfinder about how the
battered woman's perception of her position vis-a-vis the batterer is shaped by
her experience with abuse. Such testimony may be crucial to fulfilling the
requirements of self-defense under state law. 174
Case law suggests that syndrome testimony may be favorable and material
to the defense even when it is used for purposes other than bolstering a self-
defense claim. In People v. Minnis,175 a state trial court excluded expert
testimony on the syndrome when it was offered to explain the defendant's
169 Id. at 16.
170 Id. at23.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 376 (N.J. 1984) (excluded expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome was "central to the defendant's claim of self-
defense, [and] its exclusion, if otherwise admissible, [could not] be held to be harmless
error").
174 See, e.g., Kelly, 478 A.2d at 376 (because testimony on battered woman syndrome
"was central to the defendant's claim of self-defense, its exclusion, if otherwise admissible,
cannot be held to be harmless error"); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990)
(when expert testimony is offered to support a theory of self-defense, "the 'testimony [is]
essential to rebut the general misconceptions regarding battered women.") (quoting
WALKmE, THEBATrERED WOMAN, supra note 19) (emphasis added).
See Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F Supp. 451, 460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1985). But see Kelly,
478 A.2d at 375 (credibility of defendant was a "critical issue" m the case). It is axiomatic
that evidence which is merely cumulative also is not "material." See Fielder v. State, 756
S.W.2d 309, 320 (rex. Ct. App. 1988).
175 455 N.E.2d 209 (1I. Ct. App. 1983).
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conduct after the victim's death. 176 Before trial, the defendant filed a motion m
limine to exclude evidence that she had killed and then dismembered her
husband. 177 The state successfully argued, however, that the evidence was
relevant to the defendant's consciousness of guilt and should be admitted. 178 To
counter the effect of this evidence at trial, the defendant offered to introduce
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome. 179 The expert was prepared
to testify that the defendant's decision to dismember the body was influenced
by her emotional reaction to the shock of the situation, including the abuse
which she claimed to have suffered at the hands of her husband.180 The trial
court ruled that the testimony was irrelevant, however, and excluded it.is1 The
defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty-five years in
jail.182
The llinois Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the
exclusion of the expert testimony on the syndrome deprived the defendant of
her constitutional right to present a defense.183 The Court concluded that the
state's use of the dismemberment evidence to prove defendant's consciousness
of guilt made it necessary for the defendant to offer an explanation consistent
with her theory of Innocence.18 4 To this end, the "defendant had a right to
present evidence relevant to her explanation of her conduct, no matter how far-
fetched it might appear to the average mdividual." 185
Thus, expert testimony on the syndrome may be favorable and material to
the defense m various types of cases. When the testimony is offered to bolster a
claim of self-defense, it is often the centerpiece of the defense effort. Even
when offered simply to support a theory that is consistent with a belief in
innocence, however, the testimony may be vital to the defense.
B. Balancing the Interests of the State and the Accused
1. The Meaning of "Arbitrary"
Even if the accused offers testimony that is favorable and material to the
defense, its exclusion does not violate the Constitution unless it renders the trial
176 See I&L at 215.
177 1& at 211.
178 Id at 215.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 ]d.
182 Id. at 211.
183 Id. at 217.
184 Id. at 217-18.
185 Id. at 218.
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"arbitrary" or "fundamentally unfair." 186 While the rules of evidence may not
be "applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice," 187 the Constitution
does not guarantee compliance with those rules. Even a clearly erroneous
evidentiary ruling does not violate the defendant's right to present a defense
unless it can be said to have rendered the trial "arbitrary" or "fundamentally
unfair." 188
The meaning of the term "arbitrary," as applied to evidentiary rules, has
evolved somewhat over the years. In Washington, the Supreme Court
concluded that the state rule of testimonial competence at issue violated the
accused's right to compulsory process because it "arbitrarily" denied him the
right to put his witness on the stand to establish a defense.189 This rule was
unlike "nonarbitrary state rules that disqualify as witnesses persons who,
because of mental infirmity or infancy, are incapable of observing events or
testifying about them." 90 The difference is that "arbitrary" rules "prevent
whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a prion
categories that presume them unworthy of belief," 191 without allowing for
individualized examination.
Unfortunately, this distinction between "arbitrary" and "nonarbitrary"
rules of testimonial competence in Washington does not provide much
assistance in other types of cases. It does not, for instance, provide a method
for determining when rules excluding irrelevant, prejudicial, or hearsay
evidence, may have the effect of arbitrarily excluding testimony that is vital and
material to the defense.
The more recent case of Rock v. Arkansas192 provides a broader analytical
framework for determining what is an "arbitrary" rule or ruling. In Rock, the
accused was charged with manslaughter of her husband. Because she could not
remember the details of the shooting, she was hypnotized by a
neuropsychologist to refresh her memory 193 After hypnosis, she was able to
remember that at the time of the shooting, she had not held her finger on the
trigger of the gun and that the gun had discharged when her husband grabbed
her arm during a fight. 194 At trial, however, the court limited her testimony to
186 See Pennywell v. Rushen, 705 F.2d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
187 Chambers v. Missmssppi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
188 See Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 (1991); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459
U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983); Washington, 388 U.S. at 23; Chunbers, 410 U.S. at 302.
189 Washington, 388 U.S. at 23.
190 Id. at 23 n.21.
191 ld. at 22. See also Westen, Compulsory Process II, supra note 142, at 201-02.
192 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
193 Id. at 47.
19 4 Id.
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matters remembered before hypnosis and the jury convicted her of
manslaughter. 195
The Supreme Court reversed her conviction, finding that the limitations
placed on her testimony violated her constitutional right to testify on her own
behalf.196 In so doing, the Court observed that "Ojlust as a State may not apply
an arbitrary rule of competence to exclude a material defense witness from
taling the stand [see Washington], it also may not apply a rule of evidence that
permits a witness to take the stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions of
his testimony." 197 The key is that "restrictions of a defendant's right to testify
may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve. In applying its evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the
interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed upon the defendant's
constitutional right to testify "198
This passage from Rock suggests that to determine whether a rule is
"arbitrary," the interests of the state and the accused must be weighed against
one another. 199 When these competing interests are involved, it is not enough
for a court to simply examine the rule to determine in the abstract whether it is
"arbitrary " 200 The court must determine whether the "interests served by a
rule justify the limitation imposed upon the defendant's constitutional right to
testify "201 If the harmful effects of the state rule on the defendant's interest in
presenting the testimony are "disproportionate" to the purposes the rule is
designed to serve, the rule is unconstitutional. 20
While Rock is the first case to tie the "arbitrariness" language m
Washington to a balancing approach, the Court employed the approach in
195 ld.
196 Id. at 62.
197Id. at55.
198 I at 55-56. The fact that Rock involved the constitutional right to testify rather
than the right to present witnesses should not make a difference m this analysis. The right to
testify is merely the right of the defendant to testify as a witness in her own defense. This
right is protected by the Compulsory Process Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
199 At least three federal circuits employ a balancing approach to resolve conflicts
between the defendant's right to present testimony to establish a defense and the state's
interest in its rules of evidence and procedure. See Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450
(9th Cir. 1983); Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476, 481 (1st Cir.), cenr. dented, 444 U.S. 946
(1979); McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 445 U.S. 967
(1982); Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 923 (7th Cir. 1982).200 See infra Part IIIB-3.
201 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987). The Court recently reaffirmed the
"arbitrary or disproportionate" test m Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991)
(Micigan rape shield law did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present
testimony because it was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to
serve).
202 See Rock, 483 U.S. at 55.
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earlier cases without explicitly indicating that it was doing so. In Chambers v.
Misslsspp, 203 for instance, the defendant tried to introduce evidence that
another person had confessed to the crime with which he had been charged.204
This testimony clearly was crucial to the defense, but the trial court excluded it
as hearsay.205 In reviewing the exclusion of the testimony, the Supreme Court
initially recognized that the accused's right to present witnesses to establish a
defense is fundamental.206 While the accused may not offer evidence free from
the constraints of the adversarial system,20 7 the exclusion of the testimony in
this case violated the defendant's fundamental right. The defendant's interest m
presenting the testimony was compelling, because it was favorable and material
to his defense, while the state's interest m excluding the same was weak,
because even though the testimony was hearsay, it bore assurances of
trustworthiness: the statement sought to be admitted would have gone against
the declarant's penal interest.208
A more recent example of this balancing approach m operation is Crane v.
Kentucky.209 In Crane, the defendant offered to introduce witness testimony
that his out-of-court confession was not credible because he allegedly had been
forced to give it during an intense interrogation process. 210 The trial court
excluded the testimony, holding that it was only relevant to the issue of
whether the confession had been voluntary-a question which the trial court
had already ruled upon.211 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
circumstances surrounding the taking of a confession are "highly relevant" to
the factual determination of the defendant's guilt or inocence.212 The lower
court's ruling deprived the defendant "of the basic right to have the
prosecutor's case encounter and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial
testing.'" 213 Thus, the testimony should have been admitted because it was
"highly relevant" to an issue that bore upon the defendant's guilt or innocence
203 410 U.S. 284, 298.
204 As LaFave and Israel note, Chmzbers is an uncertain precedent because the Court
did not decide in that case whether the error of excluding the defense witness testimony,
standing alone, violated the defendant's due process rights. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra
note 142, at § 23.3(f) at 20.
205 See Chanbers, 410 U.S. at 294.
206 Id. at 302. See also Rushen, 713 F.2d at 1450; United States v. Garner, 581 F.2d
481, 488 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 335 (6th Cir. 1973).207 See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
20 8 See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
209 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
210 Id. at 685.
211 Id. at 686.
2 12 Id. at 691.
213 Id. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Crome, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
[V/ol. 53:363
BA7TERED WOMAN SYNDROME
and the state's interest m excluding it was weak, since its exclusionary rule was
grounded on an erroneous understanding that the testimony was irrelevant. 214
While cases applying the balancing approach are instructive here, they do
not make it simple to determine when the restrictions placed on the defendant's
right to present testimony are disproportionate to the purposes those restrictions
are designed to serve. Some have suggested that the best way to resolve the
competing interests is through a compelling or legitimate state interest test.215
This test would place the burden on the state to show that its rule excluding
defense witness testimony advanced a compelling or legitimate state interest m
order to pass constitutional muster.216
The Supreme Court has never explicitly employed this test, however. It
appears to use a case-by-case balancing approach m which the interests of the
accused and the state vary, depending upon the strength of the defendant's
interest in presenting the testimony and the purpose sought to be advanced by
the rule of evidence or procedure.2 17 In evaluating the significance of the
excluded evidence, the court considers all of the circumstances: the probative
214 Id. at 691.
215 See Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476, 481 (1st Cir.), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 946
(1979) ("[o]nce a Sixth Amendment right is implicated, the state must offer a sufficiently
compelling purpose to justify the practice"); Clinton, supra note 142, at 798.
It appears that there may be equally good support for the idea that defendant must
present a compelling reason to overcome the state's interest in its own trial rules and
procedures. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (state interest in reliable trials can
prevail over defendant's right to confront witnesses, when hearsay evidence is needed and
reliable); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-12 (1974) (interest m fair
administration of criminal justice outweighs general executive privilege in confidential
documents); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (state interest in "fair and
effective law enforcement" overrides a reporter's First Amendment interest in preserving
secrecy of sources); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (state interest in orderly
criminal trial process is sufficient to prevent federal courts from enjoining most state
criminal trials); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965) (interest in protecting state's
judicial system justified prohibiting of picketing near courthouse).
216 Clinton, supra note 142, at 798.
217 See, e.g., Chambers v. Missmppi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); see also Perry v.
Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The Supreme Court seems to have applied
a balancing test to resolve conflicts, weighing the interest of the defendant against the
state interest m the evidentiary rule"); McMorrs v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir.
1981) ("competing state interests must be substantial to overcome the claims of the
defendant"); Phillips v. Wainght, 624 F.2d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1980) (because defendant
failed to show that exclusion of certain testimony by experts was "fundamentally unfair,"
court of appeals did not need to "engage in the process of weighing the state's interest in
applying its rules governing evidentiary competency against Phillips' interest in introducing
the excluded evidence); Pettjohn, 599 F.2d 476, 481 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[o]nce a Sixth
Amendment right is inplicated, the state must offer a sufficiently compelling purpose to
justify the practice.").
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value of the evidence on the central issue, its reliability,218 whether it is the
sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative, 219 and whether it constitutes a
major part of the attempted defense.220 The weight of the state's interest
likewise depends upon many factors. The Court must determine the purpose of
the nle,2 1 its importance, how well the rule uiplements this purpose,222 and
how well the purpose applies in the case at hand.223 The Court gives due
weight to the substantial state interests in preserving orderly trials, in judicial
efficiency, and m excluding unreliable or prejudicial evidence.224
2. Misapplication of the Balancing Approach in the Syndrome Context
Thus far, only a few courts have considered whether the exclusion of
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome violates the defendant's
constitutional right to present a defense.225 The opinions on this issue are
218 C mbers, 410 U.S. at 300 (trial court denied defendant due process right to
present a defense when it excluded hearsay statement against declarant's penal interest
because it was "made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided
considerable assurance of their reliability."); accord Peny, 713 F.2d at 1453.
219 See Washington v. Texas,, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (witness whose testimony was
excluded "was the only person other than petitioner who knew exactly who had fired the
shotgun and whether petitioner had at the last minute attempted to prevent the shooting");
accord Perry, 713 F.2d at 1453.
220 See Waslungton, 388 U.S. at 23 (testimony must be "relevant and material" to the
defense m order for its exclusion to run afoul of the Sixth Amendment right to present
testimony to establish a defense); Perry, 713 F.2d at 1453.
2 2 1 See Wasiungton, 388 U.S. at 20-22 (purpose of Texas testimonial competence rule
ostensibly was to prevent perjury); Clwnbers, 410 U.S. at 298 (hearsay rule "is based on
experience and grounded m the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be presented
to the triers of fact"); accord Perry, 713 F.2d at 1453.
222 See Washington, 388 U.S. at 22-23 (state testimonial competence rule did not
serve its alleged purpose because it only applied when the defendant sought to present
testimony of a coparticipant m a crime and not when the prosecution attempted to present
the testimony of the same witness; yet the possibility that the witness would perjure himself
was at least as great when the prosecution called the witness); accord Peny, 713 F.2d at
1453.223 See Waslungton, 388 U.S. at 22.
224 Pery, 713 F.2d at 1453.
225 See supra note 1. The broader issue of whether the exclusion of expert testimony
on any scientific subject may violate the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense
has received some attention. In State v. Dorsey, 532 P.2d 912 (N.M. App. 1975), aft'd,
539 P.2d 204 (1975), for instance, a New Mexico Appellate Court held that the exclusion of
the results of a polygraph test winch tended to confirm the accused's assertion that he acted
m self-defense violated the defendant's right to present a defense. The Dorsey court
explicitly relied upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Chambers v. Misszsppi in assessing
the importance of the excluded evidence to the accused's defense and, finding the evidence
critical, held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compelled the
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somewhat confused because they do not, for the most part, employ the
balancing approach favored by the Supreme Court. The most recent opinions,
m particular, tend to give almost presumptive weight to the interest of the state
and fail to distinguish adequately between evidentiary and constitutional
concerns.
The recent case of Tourlalas v. Moms 226 demonstrates both of these
problems. By all accounts presented at trial, Andrea Tourlakis and Murray
Sparks had a violent and tumultuous relationship. Tourlakis testified that
Sparks was an intensely jealous and violent man who once placed his razor
down m a bar where Tourlakis worked and announced to her customers "you
don't touch her." 227 Tourlakis also told the court that Sparks once called her
into the kitchen of the bar, put his hands around her throat and threatened to
kill her.2 28 According to Tourlakas, Sparks also threatened her at home by
holding his razor to her throat and telling her that "he was going to cut my
body so no one else could look at me and he would break my legs." 229
Tourlakas claimed that a week before the offense, Sparks "tore [her] whole
body up" after an argument at her apartment. 23 0 After this beating, Tourlakis
shot at the wall and begged Sparks to leave.23 1 Tourlakis and Sparks argued
every night the following week about her desire to end the relationship. 232
On the night before the offense, Tourlakis and Sparks argued at her
apartment about a man who had touched her shoulder at the bar.2 33 When
Sparks arrived at the apartment the next morning, he allegedly told Tourlakis
that he loved her and began to move closer to her.2 34 At that point, Tourlakis
shot hun with a gun that she had at the apartment.23 5 Sparks then threw a
clothes basket at her and she shot and wounded him two more times.23 6 She
then chased him from her home with her gun, firing repeatedly even as he
entered an ambulance that happened to be nearby 23 7
At her bench trial, Tourlakis presented the testimony of four bar patrons to
establish that she was a battered woman and to support her theory of self-
admission of the polygraph evidence. But see State v. Galloway, 187 N.W.2d 725 (Iowa
1971) (appears to reject claim analogous to that m Dorsey); Galloway v. Brewer, 525 F.2d
369 (8th Cir. 1975) (same).
226 738 F Supp. 1128 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
227 Id. at 1130.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 1131.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
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defense. Two of them testified that Sparks had a general reputation for violence
and jealousy 23 8 Another testified that he had witnessed Sparks hold a knife to
Tourlakls.23 9 A different witness testified that Tourlakis often wore turtlenecks
to cover her bruises and that the witness had been present when Sparks
allegedly told Tourlakis that he was going to kill her.240 Finally, another
witness told the court that he broke up a fight at the bar when Sparks tried to
choke Tourlalds. 2 41
After presenting this foundation, Tourlakis attempted to offer expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome in order to support her theory of
self-defense.242 She was prevented from doing so, however, because the court
had granted the state's motion in limine to exclude all evidence related to the
battered woman syndrome.243 At the end of trial, the court found Tourlalas
guilty of attempted murder. Her conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
Upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a federal district court issued a
lengthy opinon addressing whether Tourlakis had been demed her right to
present a defense by the exclusion of expert testimony at her trial.244 The
court's reasoning is flawed in some significant respects. Instead of using the
balancing approach suggested by numerous Supreme Court cases, 245 the
district court examines whether the state court's evidentiary ruling is
"unconstitutionally arbitrary." 246 The court acknowledges in its opinion that
the "right to present a defense is unquestionably fundamental," 2 47 but it does
not attempt to assess the defendant's interest in presenting the testimony, nor
does it attempt to balance that interest against the state's interest in
exclusion.2 48 Instead, the court focuses almost entirely on whether the state rule
can be justified and whether it is possible to uphold the trial court's decision to
exclude the testimony 249
The court also appears to have misunderstood the purpose of the testimony.
Tourlakis offered the testimony to help prove that she acted in self-defense
when she shot Murray Sparks.25 0 The district court, however, treats the
238 ld
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1129.
244 Id. at 1134-40.
245 See supra Part MUB.
246 Tourlais, 738 F Supp. at 1137.
247 Id. at 1138.
248 Se u. at 1137-40.
24 9 Id. at 1137-40.
250 Id. at 1129 ("Petitioner asserted the defense of self-defense at trial, attempting to
establish the victim's reputation and propensity for violence, including specific prior violent
acts against petitioner. ").
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testimony as having been offered to prove a substantive defense based upon the
syndrome itself and not as having been offered to aid the court m determining
whether Tourlakis acted m self-defense. The court's misunderstanding is
evident from statements asserting that the trial court was not bound to accept "a
defense based upon such expert testimony "251
The Tourlakis court also confuses the constitutional issue with evidentiary
concerns. 25 2 In its discussion of whether the trial court violated the defendant's
constitutional right to present a defense, the district court twice notes that
"'[s]cientific evidence impresses lay jurors [because] they tend to assume it is
more accurate and objective than lay testimony'" and that "'in the mind of the
typical lay juror, a scientific witness has a special aura of credibility "253 The
court also notes that trial courts are generally granted far more discretion m
deciding whether to admit expert testimony than they are with respect to fact
testimony 25 4
While perhaps true, these generalizations about the admissibility of
scientific evidence serve little or no purpose m the constitutional analysis. In
Chambers, the Supreme Court purposely looked beyond the trial court's
characterization of the rejected testimony as hearsay to determine whether the
testimony bore assurances of trustworthiness. 25 5 In fact, the principal error of
the trial court m Chambers was in failing to look beyond the characterization of
the evidence to consider its importance to the defendant and its reliability under
the circumstances. 25 6 Similarly, in Washington, the Court rejected the state's
assertion that coparticipants in a crime are, in all cases, incompetent to testify
for one another. 25 7 This blanket rule did not account for the reliability of the
testimony offered m that particular case.25 8
In Tourlalas, use of the balancing approach certainly would have provided
a much stronger case for the introduction of the testimony Ohio's interest in its
evidentiary rule was very weak. The Ohio Supreme Court had created its rule
excluding testimony on the syndrome m 1981 when the syndrome itself was
still being evaluated as a scientific theory m the courts. 25 9 By the time
Tourlakis was decided in 1990, however, the Ohio Supreme Court had
251 Id. at 1138 (referring to the precedent established m State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d
137 (Ohio 1981), which was later overruled by State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Olo
1990)).252 It is entirely possible that the court viewed itself as being in a position similar to an
appellate court that reviews lower court evidentiary rulings on direct appeal for abuse of
discretion only.
253 Tourlakis, 738 F Supp. at 1137, 1139.
25 4 Id. at 1139.
255 See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-303 (1973).
256 See I&
25 7 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).
258 See I& at 22.
25 9 See State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (Ohio 1981).
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overruled its earlier case and had recognized, like most states, that battered
woman syndrome is a well-accepted scientific theory beyond the ken of the
average juror, and that testimony on the syndrome is relevant to the issue of
self-defense and not overly prejudicial to the prosecution. 260
Tourlakis's interest in presenting the testimony was quite strong.261 Her
only defense was self-defense.262 Ohio requires that a person seelng to
establish self-defense show that she subjectively believed that she was in
imminent danger of death or grievous bodily harm at the time of the offense.263
The testimony on the syndrome would have helped explain how Tourlakis
might have believed that she was in immnent danger at the time of the offense
even though she might not have appeared so to a neutral third party 264
In Fennell v. Goolsby,265 another district court fell into some of the same
analytical traps as the Tourlakas court. One night in 1979, Karen Fennell, a 46-
year-old woman, drove her car to a service station near her home in
Norristown, Pennsylvania where her husband's automobile was parked. 266 She
drove at his car and struck it with her own while he was in the driver's seat.26 7
She then backed up, drove forward, and struck his car again.2658 Her husband
escaped from the car and attempted to run to the service station, but before he
was able to reach the office, she struck him with her car several times. 269 The
husband was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. 270
Fennell was subsequently charged with murder, voluntary manslaughter,
involuntary manslaughter, aggravated assault and recklessly endangering other
people.271 At her trial, Fennell offered direct evidence of abuse she suffered at
the hands of her husband. Her son testified that his father had frequently hit his
mother and had threatened her with a knife.272 Her daughter testified that her
260 See State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Oluo 1990) (overruling Thomas).
261 The expert testimony m Tourlakas may not have been enough to change the result
of the trial. A person claming self-defense has a duty to retreat from a known risk. See,
e.g., People v. Stallworth, 111 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Mich. 1961). The record m Tourlas
suggests that Tourlakls did not observe this duty because she repeatedly shot at Sparks, even
when he was m retreat from her apartment. See Tourlalas, 738 F Supp. at 1131. A person
is not obliged to retreat if assaulted m her dwelling, however. See Stallworth, 111 N.W.2d
at 746.262 See Tourlakas, 738 F Supp. at 1129.
263 See State v. Sheets, 152 N.E. 664 (Ohio 1926).
264 See Infra Part JIIC.
265 630 F Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
266 Id. at 454.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 456.
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father often harassed her mother and often would not let her sleep. 273 The
petitioner herself testified to almost constant physical and mental abuse over a
three- to four-year period. 274 She testified that her husband had a severe
drinking problem and that he "threatened her verbally, pushed, kicked,
punched, and tried to choke her." 275 On one occasion, he tried to burn her
with a cigarette and he would often force himself upon her sexually 276
After laying this foundation, Fennell offered to present expert testimony on
the battered woman syndrome. While Fennell claimed self-defense and insanity
as defenses, the asserted purpose of the testimony was to support her credibility
concerning the nature of her relationship with her husband. 277
The trial court excluded the expert testimony on the basis that the expert
did not have personal knowledge of the defendant's condition either before or
after the killing.278 Fennell was then convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
After exhausting her remedies m state court, she filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. In a lengthy opiuon, the district court first determined that
the reason offered by the trial court for refusing the evidence was erroneous. 279
The fact that the expert never personally examined or interviewed Fennell did
not render her testimony madmissible.280 The court held, however, that the
exclusion of the testimony did not violate defendant's right to present a defense
because the testimony was not critical to a fair trial.281 The expert testimony
was only offered for the limited purpose of supporting the defendant's
credibility and, therefore, the exclusion did not violate Fennell's right to
present witnesses m her defense.282
Fennell appears to be correctly decided. The critical fact in the case is that
the defendant offered the battered woman syndrome testimony only to support
her own credibility and not to prove elements of a defense.283 A less
persuasive, but significant fact is that two other psychiatrists testified at trial
273 Id. at 457.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 459-60. In post-trial motions and briefs, however, Fennell asserted that the
testimony would have explained how continued abuse could affect behavior, perceptions,
and mental state. Id. at 460.
278 See t& at 456.
279 Id. at 457.
280 Id.; cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 903 (1983) (expert testimony regarding
future dangerousness of defendant need not be based on personal examination of the
defendant).
281 d at 460-61.
282 Id
283 . State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375 (NJ. 1984) (expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome was admissible to bolster credibility of defendant because "Itihe
credibility of [the defendant] is a critical issue m this case").
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concerning Fennell's mental capacity, so that another expert's testimony on the
same issue might have been cumulative. 284
Some of the reasoning m the Fennell case, however, is troublesome. The
court suggests, for instance, that a defendant's right to present expert testimony
to support her defense is somehow of a lower order than the defendant's
interest in presenting "factual testimony "285 The court draws this conclusion
after observing that in Washington,28 6 the state had excluded the testimony of
witnesses who were capable of testifying to events they had "'personally
observed.'" The Fennell court interprets Washington as implying a lower level
of constitutional protection for noneyewitness testimony 287
The suggestion that a defendant's interest m presenting expert testimony
should receive less constitutional protection than a defendant's interest m
presenting so-called factual testimony is not well founded. While the witness in
Washington had "personally observed" the events giving rise to the criminal
prosecution, there is no indication m Washington that the Court meant to
suggest that factual testimony is more reliable and critical to the defense.28 8 In
other cases, the Court has indicated that expert testimony on the defendant's
psychological condition, especially when relevant to a recognmzed defense, is at
least as valuable as factual testimony 289
This is particularly true m the context of the battered woman syndrome. If
the fact-finder understands and gives credence to the expert testimony, the
defendant may be able to establish that she acted m self-defense. 290 Without the
expert testimony, a fact-finder may be unable to understand why a battered
woman would not leave her mate, but would resort to violence even when her
284 See Fennell, 630 F Supp. at 461. This is somewhat less persuasive because it is
not clear from the district court's opinion whether the other experts were competent or
prepared to testily on the specific issue of battered woman syndrome.
285 See Id. at 460-61. We say "suggests" because the court is not clear about what it is
drving at with its discussion of the difference between expert and so-called factual
testimony.
286 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
2 87 Fennell, 630 F Supp. at 460-61 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23
(1967)).
288 If the Court were of the view that expert testimony is deserving of less
constitutional protection than so-called "factual testimony," it certainly could have made this
clear in a number of cases. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975),
(respondent argued that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony depnved him of his
right to present witnesses in hIs own defense); c. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
711 (1974) (Sixth Amendment protects defendant's right to the production of "all evidence"
at a criminal trial).
289 In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79-80 (1985) for instance, the Court observed
that a mental health expert often plays a "pivotal role in criminal proceedings" and that
the expert's testimony "may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his
defense."2 90 See supra Part 11.
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batterer is in an apparently passive stage.291 Because the expert testimony
offers the fact-finder a glimpse into what may be an unfamiliar psychological
condition, the testimony may be at least as valuable to the battered woman's
defense as an eyewitness account of the offense itself.
C. Syndrome Testimony in the Nontraditional Case
Tourlalas and Fennell implicitly raise a larger question about whether- a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present expert testimony on the
syndrome m what has been previously described as a "nontraditional" case of
self-defense.292 A "nontraditional" self-defense case is one in which the
underlying facts reveal that the victim did not make a hostile demonstration of
force against the defendant at the time of or immediately prior to the offense.
Both Tourlaaks and Fennell fit in this category In Tourlalas, the defendant shot
at her lover even though he was not abusing her or threatening her with a
weapon at the time of the offense. Similarly, in Fennell, the defendant killed
her husband with her car at a local gas station. In both cases, but for different
reasons, the trial court excluded expert testimony on the syndrome.
The trial court decisions m Tourlaas and Fennell are not unusual. Several
courts have excluded testimony on the syndrome m nontraditional self-defense
cases. 293 In State v. Burton,294 for instance, a Louisiana court excluded
testimony on the syndrome offered by the defendant to support a self-defense
claim because she failed to produce "'evidence of hostile demonstration or of
[an] overt act on the part of the person slain or injured,'" which is a necessary
predicate in Louisiana to the introduction of any defense evidence tending to
291 See supra Part L
292 See supra Part ]I.
293 See, e.g., Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (exclusion of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was proper when defendant had not made
sufficient showing of imminence because defendant shot victim while sitting on a couch);
People v. Ars, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (evidence related to battered
woman syndrome inadmissible when victim asleep at time of the offense); State v. Norman,
378 S.E.2d 8, 13-16 (N.C. 1989) (no error when trial court refused to instruct jury on self-
defense because victim was asleep at time of offense); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577
(Kan. 1988) (victim asleep at time of offense). But see State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793
(Kmnn. 1989) (trial court did not rule out self-defense as a matter of law when husband-
victim was sleeping and state supreme court did not discuss question in ruling on
admissibility of battered woman syndrome testimony); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811
(N.D. 1983) (reasonableness required for self-defense measured by subjective standard, but
did not define inmminence in context of sleeping husband-victim); State v. Williams, 787
S.W.2d 308 (Miss. Ct. App. 1990) (syndrome evidence admissible when defendant struck
out at batterer immediately after the beating).
294 464 So.2d 421 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
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impugn the victim's character. 295 Similarly, m State v. Norman,296 the North
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's decision not to instruct the jury
on self-defense when the defendant was unable to produce evidence of an
immediate physical threat at the time of the offense.297 This was despite
defense evidence showing years of abuse, threats to kill, and a pronounced
escalation m violence in the hours leading up to the offense.
These courts are fearful that any dilution of the imminence requirement for
self-defense will encourage battered women to use self-help. 298 They are also
concerned that testimony on the syndrome may be- prejudicial to the
prosecution because it suggests to the jury that it may focus on the victim's bad
character m assessing the defendant's culpability 299
While these concerns are legitimate and weighty, it is our view that courts
which impose narrow "imminence" standards and "reasonableness"
requirements will deny some defendants their constitutional right to present a
defense. The Model Penal Code describes the difference between "imminent"
and "immediate." A defendant must believe that her defensive action is
"immediately necessary," but she "need not apprehend [that the force against
which she defends] will be immediately used."30o She need only "apprehendi-
[that the force] will be used on the present occasion." 30 1 Courts such as those
in Burton and Norman, requiring evidence of an overt act of hostility at the
time of the offense, implicitly reject this standard. They require, m effect, that
295 See u at 426 (quoting LSA-R.S. 15:482). For a discussion of Louisiana's response
to the battered woman syndrome, see Rebecca Hudsmith, Note, The Adrmssibility of Expert
Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome in Battered Women's Self-Defense Cases i
Louisiana, 47 LA. L. REV 979 (1987).
296 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
297 Id. at 13-16. For a valuable critique of Norman, including suggestions for
legislative action, see Kerry A. Shad, Comment, Survey of Developments in North Carolina
Law, 1989, State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavailable to Battered Women Who Kill
Passive Abusers, 68 N.C. L. REV 1159 (1990).
298 See Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 15; see also Kinports, supra note 93, at 420; Rosen,
supra note 6, at 53 (using traditional rules of self-defense m nontraditional self-defense
situation would treat self-defense as an excuse rather than a justification).
299 See, e.g., Burton, 464 So.2d at 428-29; Chapman v. State, 386 S.E.2d 129, 131
(Ga. 1989).
300 Model Penal Code § 3.04(1) (1985).
301 Id., see also State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985) (reversing defendant's
conviction for involuntary manslaughter because the term "immediate" rather than
"imminent" appeared m the jury instructions for self-defense); State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d
548 (Wash. 1977) (instruction limiting the jury's inquiry to the time immediately pnor to a
shooting was erroneous because it restricted the jury's inquiry into the surrounding
circumstances). But see State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989) (suggesting that
term "imminent" is synonymous with "immediate"); People v. Ans, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167,
172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (defining "imminent peril" as "immediate and present and not
prospective or even in the near future").
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the defendant show that the force against which she defended herself was to be
immediately used. They do not allow for the possibility that a defendant may
believe her action is immediately necessary even if she apprehends only that
her batterer will use force "on the present occasion."
These courts also undervalue the principle that "imminence" should be
determined from the defendant's perspective. What appears "imminent" to a
battered woman may not appear "imminent" to a judge with cool hindsight.
Credible scientific research suggests that battered women sometimes have a
legitimate fear of mminent death or great bodily harm even when they are not
being immediately threatened. 302 Some battered women are m an almost
constant state of danger and fear for their lives.303 A lull m a violent, abusive
episode may be the battered woman's only opportunity to escape from a course
of violence that will lead to her death or severe injury
Moreover, because the syndrome theory is centered on the idea that a
reasonable person would react like the defendant under the circumstances, it is
relevant even in states that have objective reasonableness standards. 304 The
defendant should be given the opportunity to convince the fact-finder that her
action was reasonable under the circumstances. Courts that deny the defendant
this chance in some nontraditional cases are prejudging the validity of the
syndrome theory These courts undermne the well-settled principle that a
defendant should be permitted the widest of latitudes when introducing
evidence in support of a self-defense theory, particularly when the defendant is
charged with homicide. 305
302 See WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 19, at 75; WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 72. Even critics of scientific research on the
syndrome concede that there is a "basic msght" represented by the research and that "[b]y
asking only what a highly abstracted 'reasonable person' would do, the law turns a blind
eye to the woman's history of abuse, to the social and economic pressures preventing her
from leaving, and to her engrossing fear." Faigman, supra note 6, at 643.
303 Eber, supra note 6, at 928-29; see also Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 18 (Martin, J.,
dissenting) ("Evidence presented m the case sub judice revealed no letup of tension or fear,
no moment m which the defendant felt released from unpending serious harm, even while
the defendant slept.").
304 While some states employ an objective standard of self-defense, see supra note 99,
that standard still requires the fact-finder to consider the defendant's perception of
mmnence and the reasonableness of that perception. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d
572 (Kan. 1988).
305 Borders v. State, 433 So.2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983); Palm v. State, 184
So. 881 (Fla. 1938); Garner v. State, 9 So. 835 (Fla. 1891). Compare Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 896-903 (1983) (court properly admitted prosecution's expert psychiatric
testimony on the issue of defendant's future dangerousness, despite nusgivings of scientific
community regarding accuracy of research, when defendant had the opportunity to cross-
examine the expert witnesses or present experts of Ins own m rebuttal). Cf Kaplan v.
California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973) (m exercising discretion, the trial court must be
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Of course, not every nontraditional case will bring these issues into focus.
In the future, the most effective constitutional challenges to the exclusion of
syndrome testimony will undoubtedly arise where the facts are particularly
well-suited to explanation by the syndrome theory For instance, m a case
where a husband has severely abused his wife over several years and the
evidence suggests that at the time of the offense, the husband had merely taken
a temporary break from a course of violence designed to kill or severely injure
the defendant,30 a court may conclude that exclusion of testimony on the
syndrome would deny the defendant her constitutional right to present
testimony on an issue that is vital and material to her defense. On the other
hand, cases where the facts reveal that the defendant hunted down her husband
and killed hun or hired an assassin to do the same will not, it seems, bring the
issue into focus. 30 7
IV. EXPERT ASSISTANCE AND THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT
The right to present expert testimony at trial is an empty one for an
indigent defendant if it does not carry with it a related right to the assistance of
an expert at state expense.308 In a series of cases dating back to Griffin v.
Rllinots,3 9 the Supreme Court has recognized that indigent defendants must
have access to certain "fundamental tools" of due process at state expense to
ensure a fair trial.310 It Is only recently, however, that the Court has considered
whether a mental health expert may be one of these "fundamental tools." 311
guided by the principle that the "defense should be free to introduce appropriate expert
testimony").
306 See, e.g., WALKER, TERRMYING LOVE, supra note 28, at 117-20 (m the course of
beating and pistol-whipping Ins wife, batterer left the room to use the restroom, warning his
wife not to move; defendant shot him while he was still using the facilities).
307 See, e.g., Boyd v. State, 581 A.2d 1 (Md. 1990) (defendant paid $1800 to
dynamite her husband's car); State v. Dannels, 734 P.2d 188, 191-92 (Mont. 1987)
(defendant hired two men to asphyxiate her husband during a faked burglary of their motel
room); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (defendant hired hit
man to kill her estranged husband).
308 See John F Decker, Expert Sermces in the Defense of Cnnunal Cases: The
Constitutional and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REV 574 (1982); Ephraim
Margolin & Allen Wagner, The Indigent Cnrrnal Defendant and Defense Services: A
Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 647 (1973); Katherine F Fortino,
Note, An Indigent's Constitutional Right to a State-Paid Expert-Williams v. Martin, 16
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1031 (1980); Michael I. Yaworsky, Annotation, Right of In&gent
Defendant in State Cnmrnal Case to Asstance of Expert in Social Attitudes, 74 A.L.R.4th
330.
309 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
310 In Griffin, the Court recognized that once a state offers criminal defendants the
opportunity to appeal, it must provide a trial transcript to an indigent defendant if the
transcript is necessary to a decision on the merits of the appeal. In Burns v. Oluo, 360 U.S.
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In Ake v. Oklahoma,3 12 the defendant was charged with murdering a
couple and wounding their two children. 313 Based on his behavior before and
during his arraignment, Ake was ordered by the trial judge to submit to a
psychiatric examination. The psychiatrist diagnosed the accused as a paranoid
schizophrenic and recommended an intensive psychiatric evaluation to
determine whether he was competent to stand trial. 314 He was committed to a
state hospital, and some time later the court was informed that the accused was
not competent to stand trial.3 15 Six weeks after that, however, the hospital
reported that if the accused continued to receive his current dosage of an
antipsychotic medication, he would remain stable and be competent to stand
trial.316
At a pretrial conference, counsel for the accused informed the court that his
client would raise an insanity defense. The court denied a request by Ake's
counsel, however, to hire a psychiatrist at state expense.317 At trial, the defense
called each of the psychiatrists who had examined the accused at the state
hospital to testify None of the psychiatrists could testify regarding his mental
state at the time of the offense, however, because none had examined hn with
this purpose in mind.318 The accused was convicted of two counts of first
degree murder and two counts of shooting with intent to kill. 3 19
252, 257-58 (1959), the Court determined that an indigent defendant may not be required
to pay a fee before filing a notice of appeal of his conviction. In Gideon v. Wainright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), the Court acknowledged that an indigent defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel at trial, and m Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court
extended this right to the defendant's first direct appeal as of right.
311 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Before the Supreme Court's decision
in Ake, lower courts recognized the right to various forms of collateral assistance m
preparing the defense upon a showing of particularized need. See, e.g., Wfilliams v. Martin,
618 F.2d 1021, 1025-27 (4th Cir. 1980) (forensic pathologist); Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d
891, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (funds to permit counsel to investigate case); State v. Madison,
345 So.2d 485, 490 (La. 1977). See generally Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Right of
Indigent Cmnnal Defendant to Poygraph Test at Public Epense, 11 A.L.R. 4th 733.
312 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
313 Id. at 70. For an excellent discussion of Ake and its implications, see John M.
West, Note, Epert Sermces and the IndIgent Cnrnunal Defendant: The Constitutional
Mandate ofAke v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV 1326 (1986). For a pre-Ake discussion of
the indigent criminal defendant's right to a psychiatric expert at state expense, see Dean C.
Gramlich, Note, An Indigent Cnnunal Defendant's Constitutional Right to a Psychiatnc
Eapen, 1984 ILL. L. REV 481 (1984).3 14 Ake, 470 U.S. at 71.315 Id.
316 1d.
3 17 Id. at72.
318 Id.319 Id. at 73.
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At the sentencing hearing, the state asked for the death penalty.320 The
prosecution relied upon the testimony of the state psychiatrists to show the
accused was dangerous and likely to remain so.32i The accused had no expert
witnesses to rebut this testimony or to offer evidence in mitigation. 322 The jury
sentenced hun to death on each of the two murder counts and 500 years
imprisonment on each of the shooting with intent to kill counts.323 The
conviction and sentences were affirmed on appeal, 324 and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 325
In its opinion reversing the decision of the trial court, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that fundamental fairness entities indigent defendants to an
"'adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary
system.' ' 326 Indigent defendants have an "adequate opportunity" to present
their claims only when they are provided with the "basic tools" of an adequate
defense.327
To determine whether a "tool" requested by the accused is "basic" or
essential to fundamental fairness, the Court took three factors into account.
First, it considered the private interest that would be affected by the action of
the State.328 Second, it weighed the governmental interest that would be
affected if the safeguard were provided.329 Third, it considered the probable
value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that were sought,
and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those
safeguards were not provided.330
As to the first factor, the Court said that "[t]he private interest in the
accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 See i. (citing 633 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crun. App. 1983)).
325 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
326 Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)). While
Ake is founded on the Due Process Clause, the Illinois courts have suggested that there also
may be a Sixth Amendment right of an indigent defendant to the assistance of a state-paid
expert. See People v. Watson, 221 N.E.2d 645 (IMI. 1966); People v. Nichols, 70 111. App.
3d 748 (1979) (trial court's refusal to provide funds to the defendant for obtaining
psychiatric evaluation of his sanity at the time of the offense deprived the defendant of his
Sixth Amendment right to compel the attendance of witnesses).
At least one commentator has criticized the Illinois courts, however, for "needlessly
overextend[ing] the principles embodied m the sixth amendment." See Gramlich, supra note
313, at 496.327 Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
328 ld. at 78.
329 Id. at 78-79.
330 Id. at 79-80.
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risk is almost uniquely compelling." 331 In contrast, the State's argument that it
would be a "staggering burden" to provide psychiatric assistance to all
qualified defendants was unpersuasive.3 32 The Court noted that such assistance
was currently provided by the federal government and many states with
apparently no excessive burden.333 Aside from the economic consequences, the
state's interest m prevailing at trial was "necessarily tempered by its interest m
the fair and accurate adjudication" of criminal trials.3 34 Finally, as to the
probable value of the assistance sought, the Court observed "that when the
State has made the defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal
culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a
psychiatrist may well be crucid to the defendant's ability to marshal his
defense." 335 Without the ability of the defense to offer its own expert evidence,
"the risk of maccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high." 336
The Court imposed a significant limitation on the right to psychiatric
assistance, however. It is only when the "defendant demonstrates to the trial
judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at
trial, [that] the State must, at a nmmum, assure the defendant access to a
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist
m evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense." 337
Ake should have a profound effect on the ability of indigent defendants to
obtain expert assistance and testimony on the battered woman syndrome. The
same "privacy interest" in the accuracy of criminal proceedings that was at
stake in A/W38 is present in cases in which the defendant seeks to prove self-
defense through battered woman syndrome evidence. The financial burden to
the state of providing such assistance is a question that is open for debate and
beyond the scope of this Article. 339 Suffice it to say here, however, that the
331 Id. at 78.
3 32 Id.
333 Id. at 79 n.5 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1), wich provides expert assistance to
a criminal defendant m afederal prosecution when it is necessary for an adequate defense).
3341d.
335 Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
3 36 Id. at 82.
337 Id. at 83. For a critique of this "significant factor" test m the context of non-
psychiatric expert assistance, see A. Michelle Wtillis, Nonpsycduatnc E&pert Assistance and
the Requasite Showng of Need.. A Catch-22 in the Post-Ake Cnnunal Justice System, 37
EMORY LJ. 995 (1988).
A federal circuit court case decided after Ake notes that when an indigent defendant
makes a clear showing that his mental condition will be a significant factor at trial, the judge
has a clear duty to appoint a psychiatric expert to assist in the defense of the case even if a
psychiatrist has been previously appointed to examine the defendant at the request of the
government. See United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1985).
33 8 Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
339 It appears that the burden of providing expert assistance on the syndrome would
not be "staggering." See, e.g., West, supra note 313, at 1339 n.93 (discussing "modest
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Supreme Court's comment m Ake about the financial burden of providing
similar assistance m insanity-defense cases appears to be equally applicable
here: the state's interest in the economic consequences of providing expert
assistance to an indigent defendant must be tempered by its interest m fair and
accurate adjudication. 34 And in the battered woman syndrome context, as m
the insanity defense context, the expert's assistance "may well be crucial to the
defendant's ability to marshal [a] defense." 341
Of course, the limitations on the expert assistance in Ake should also be
applicable in the context of the battered woman syndrome. A defendant must
demonstrate to the trial judge that testimony on battered woman syndrome will
be a significant factor in her defense before she will be granted access to an
expert at public expense. 342 What is "significant" obviously will have to be
decided on a case-by-case basis.343
V. CONCLUSION
A mythology has grown up around the subject of spousal abuse. The
mythology holds that battered women are free to leave their abusive mates but
choose to stay, that battered women sometimes enjoy the abuse they endure,
and that battered women do something to provoke the abuse.
The studies about the battered woman syndrome contradict these myths.
Research on the syndrome suggests that abusive relationships follow a cyclical
pattern and that battered women often suffer from learned helplessness and
annual costs for all expert services incurred by the federal government and a sample of
states").
340 Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
341 Id. at 80; see also State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 376 (N.J. 1984) (excluded expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome was "central to the defendant's claim of self-
defense, [and] its exclusion, if otherwise admissible, [could not] be held to be harmless
error"). See generally Richard 3. Bonme & Christopher Slobogm, The Role of Mental
Health Profesnonals zn the Cnnunal Justice Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66
VA. L. REV 427 (1980).
342 See Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83. Tins has been described as a "presumed need"
standard. See West, supra note 313, at 1357 (citing Margolin & Wagner, supra note 308, at
644-65). Under this standard, "[o]nce the defendant has shown that the relevant issue exists,
no further particularized showing is necessary." Id. at 1358.
343 The most significant case on this issue so far is Dunn v. Roberts, 768 F. Supp.
1442 (D. Kan. 1991). In Dunn, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
cited Ake in holding that the petitioner's due process right had been abridged when the trial
court demed her request for expert assistance on the battered woman syndrome m order to
prove a defense of compulsion.
In State v. Aucom, 756 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. 1988), the defendant was deied state
funds to obtain the assistance of an independent psychiatrist with knowledge of the battered
woman syndrome. See also State v. Dannels, 734 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1987) (defendant
requested funds to retain specific psychiatric expert and was demed).
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other psychological disorders associated with intensive and prolonged abuse.
Battered women feel trapped by abuse. They often feel worthless and powerless
and perceive their mates to be omnipotent.
Despite the growing acceptance of the syndrome theory in the crinmal
justice system, some courts are reluctant to admit testimony on the syndrome in
nontraditional self-defense cases. This reluctance is also manifested in an
unwillingness to provide state-funded access to experts on the syndrome to
indigent defendants. These courts are concerned that the immmence
requirement of self-defense may become watered down by testimony on the
syndrome and that this testimony may bear more upon the character of the
victim than the innocence of the defendant.
The exclusion of the testimony in some nontraditional cases, however, may
violate the accused's constitutional right to present a defense. Expert testimony
on the syndrome generally is favorable and material to the defense. State rules
excluding syndrome testimony for lack of an "overt act" of hostility on the part
of the victim, or for similar reasons, are susceptible to the charge that they
arbitrarily exclude vital defense evidence. A battered woman may reasonably
believe herself to be in nmminent danger and unable to retreat even when her
spouse is not engaged in an overt act of violence at the time of the offense. To
suggest otherwise is to hold onto a narrow and outdated conception of what is
"imminent" and what is "reasonable" in the context of an abusive relationship.
"The law cannot be allowed to be mired in antiquated notions about human
responses when a body of knowledge is available which is capable of providing
insight." 344
344 Thomas v. Am, 728 F.2d 813, 815 (6th Cir. 1984) (Jones, J., concurring).
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